From: "Alexis Lothoré" <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev,
"Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)" <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2026 16:11:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DJT91CC6V6TS.1U8K4LYH8LMZ2@bootlin.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260708081937.5D5031F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On Wed Jul 8, 2026 at 10:19 AM CEST, sashiko-bot wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [Medium] Incorrect or inconsistent calculation of `insn_off_in_patch` causes loss or misassignment of `aux_data`.
> - [Medium] A single `insn_off_in_patch` integer is insufficient to propagate KASAN memory markings to patches that emit multiple memory accesses.
> --
>
> --- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program ---
> commit 6ebaaf2368d2745f393ec38eb53d5857d5ec62b8
> Author: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
>
> bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program
>
> When the verifier patches an ebpf program with bpf_patch_insn_data, it
> then calls adjust_insn_aux_data to make sure that insn_aux_data takes
> into account the newly inserted patch.
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>> index 12a8a4eb757f1..f515fc9669ce2 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -856,16 +862,20 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
>> continue;
>> convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
>> + insn_off_in_patch = 0;
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Will this properly track context accesses that are converted into multiple
> chained memory loads?
>
> By relying on a single integer to track the offset, it seems we might fail to
> account for multi-load patches emitted by ops->convert_ctx_access() (for
> example, reading skb->dev followed by dev->ifindex). The secondary memory
> accesses will receive zeroed aux_data and lack the required KASAN
> non_stack_access marking.
>
> Additionally, since the original instruction is completely replaced here, does
> it make sense to unconditionally assign its aux_data to the first generated
> instruction, which might not even be the actual memory access?
Hmmm, true, there's an issue here. I have checked many XXX_convert_ctx
accesses and naively assumed that the generated patch was always a
single ldx or stx, but indeed, there are corner cases:
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->ifindex becomes LDX + JPM + LDX
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->pkt_type becomes LDX + AND
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->queue_mapping becomes (JMP +) ST or STX
- and many more
For all of those XXX_convert_ctx_accesses, the accessed memory should
always be checked with KASAN since we are dealing with ctx pointers, so
it may be simpler just to pass -1 as insn_off_patches to
bpf_patch_insn_data for all of those, so that any LDX/STX/ST in the new
patch is instrumented.
>> @@ -1464,7 +1475,7 @@ static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *pat
>> * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations
>> * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops.
>> */
>> - prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len);
>> + prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len, -1);
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Is it intentional to pass -1 for the offset here?
>
> Since the original instruction is explicitly preserved in the patch buffer
> in bpf_do_misc_fixups():
>
> *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1];
>
> Passing -1 to bpf_patch_insn_data() will cause the aux_data associated with
> that instruction to be lost.
True, but: unless I am missing some corner cases, eBPF programs end with BPF_EXIT,
so it is pointless to forward an original instruction offset. But for
the sake of separating concerns, I'll update this to pass 0 instead of
-1.
>> @@ -1743,7 +1765,8 @@ int bpf_do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
>> cnt = patch - insn_buf;
>>
>> - new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
>> + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
>> + cnt, -1);
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> In this pointer arithmetic rewrite, the original ALU instruction is preserved
> in the patch buffer (*patch++ = *insn).
>
> Should we calculate and pass its exact offset inside the patch buffer instead
> of passing -1, which discards its aux_data?
Ditto: having the exact instruction offset for this case is not useful
as it is not a load or store, but I'll still update the offset value (-1
-> cnt - 1)
Alexis
--
Alexis Lothoré, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-08 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 8:00 [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/10] bpf: add support for KASAN checks in JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:11 ` Alexis Lothoré [this message]
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 02/10] bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:15 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/10] bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 12:48 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 04/10] bpf, x86: add helper to emit kasan checks in x86 " Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:20 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 05/10] bpf, x86: refactor BPF_ST management in do_jit Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 06/10] bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks into x86 JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:29 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 07/10] bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86 Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:33 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 08/10] selftests/bpf: add helper to check whether eBPF KASAN is active Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 09/10] selftests/bpf: move bpf_jit_harden helper into testing_helpers Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:43 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 10/10] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:47 ` Alexis Lothoré
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=DJT91CC6V6TS.1U8K4LYH8LMZ2@bootlin.com \
--to=alexis.lothore@bootlin.com \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.