From: "Brendan Jackman" <brendan.jackman@linux.dev>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Brendan Jackman" <brendan.jackman@linux.dev>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@google.com>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: disable under HIGHMEM
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:22:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DJZ3TQV3GPDO.6AN321FGTTX@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <503aee9e-97fc-4889-a379-3c0a5d140554@kernel.org>
On Mon Jul 6, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 7/5/26 13:34, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> On Sun, Jul 05, 2026 at 10:46:19AM +0000, Brendan Jackman wrote:
>>> On Sun Jul 5, 2026 at 2:26 AM UTC, Andrew Morton wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Well OK, but the secretmem code is still wrong. The patch protects
>>>> people from hitting the bug but leaves the bug in place. Surely it would be
>>>> better to fix the bug?
>>>
>>> I don't think the code is wrong if highmem is disabled. Certainly
>>> there is an implicit coupling between the .c file and the Kconfig file,
>>> but we could always add a BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECRETMEM)) to
>>> the relevant bit of code to make it explicit.
>>>
>>>> Is that as simple as adding the folio_test_highmem() test?
>>>
>>> This would fix the WARN+SIGBUS but I don't think it resolves the fact
>>> that this configuration is completely untested - there are likely other
>>> functional bugs? But more importantly, I am not sure if secretmem
>>> actually does its security job if kmap_local_page() isn't a NOP. I
>>> think shipping a "security feature" that doesn't do what it says would
>>> be really terrible. (It might work totally fine, I dunno, but it would
>>> require some research and deep thinking that I don't really want to do
>>> for a configuration with no users).
>>>
>>>> Or switching to GFP_KERNEL?
>>>
>>> ... Oh, that's a nice idea though :)
>>
>> GFP_USER if anything :)
>
> Right.
>
>>
>> But still with kmap() and friends not being an NOP the promise "kernel does
>> not map this memory" does not hold.
>>
>> I think that keeping SECRETMEM and HIGHMEM mutually exclusive is
>> conceptually correct.
>
> We could even limit it to 64BIT ;)
I fear this in limbo, we have quite a wide range of opinions from "fix
the broken configuration" all the way to "disable secretmem completely on
32bit". I'm not passionately committed to any one answer but I do think
we need to pick something.
Mike's position seems to be roughly "in the middle" of the spectrum, and
(conveniently for me) happens to align with what I did in the [PATCH].
So... could we go ahead with this?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-15 11:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-03 14:48 [PATCH] mm/secretmem: disable under HIGHMEM Brendan Jackman
2026-07-04 6:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-05 2:26 ` Andrew Morton
2026-07-05 10:46 ` Brendan Jackman
2026-07-05 11:34 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-06 8:42 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-15 11:22 ` Brendan Jackman [this message]
2026-07-15 11:33 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-15 12:31 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-15 13:44 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-15 13:49 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-07-15 14:58 ` Mike Rapoport
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