From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2008 08:41:27 +1100 (EST) From: James Morris To: Stephen Smalley cc: Eric Paris , Eric Paris , selinux , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com Subject: Re: How to handle security_dentry_open when the open flags are 'special' In-Reply-To: <1205504199.22912.52.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Message-ID: References: <1205349239.2925.11.camel@localhost.localdomain> <7e0fb38c0803121220w21275aadl7f148eccf645a7f1@mail.gmail.com> <43af0f430803130456y844d429j2a64fb46ec4d71a7@mail.gmail.com> <1205504199.22912.52.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Fri, 14 Mar 2008, Stephen Smalley wrote: > Alternatively, we could default to returning FILE__IOCTL from > file_to_av() if the f_mode has neither FMODE_READ nor FMODE_WRITE, and > thus check ioctl permission on exec or transfer, thereby validating such > descriptors early as with normal r/w descriptors and catching leaks of > them prior to attempted usage. I think this sounds like a good plan. > > selinux_dentry_open() though doesn't need to check anything in this > case; its checking is only required for descriptors that can later be > used in read/write operations. > > -- James Morris -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.