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From: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
To: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	coverity-bot <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	linux-next@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Coverity: console_prepend_dropped(): Memory - corruptions
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 16:51:49 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y8ZTlVX3HQUVkU13@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <877cxl3abr.fsf@jogness.linutronix.de>

On (23/01/17 08:16), John Ogness wrote:
> On 2023-01-17, Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On (23/01/16 17:35), Petr Mladek wrote:
> >> 	len = snprintf(scratchbuf, scratchbuf_sz,
> >> 		       "** %lu printk messages dropped **\n", dropped);
> >
> > Wouldn't
> >
> > 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len + PRINTK_PREFIX_MAX >= outbuf_sz))
> > 		return;
> >
> > prevent us from doing something harmful?
> 
> Sure. But @0len is supposed to contain the number of bytes in
> @scratchbuf, which theoretically it does not. snprintf() is the wrong
> function to use here, even if there is not real danger in this
> situation.

Oh, yes, I agree that snprintf() should be replaced. Maybe we can go
even a bit furhter and replace all snprintf()-s in kernel/printk/*
(well, in a similar fashion, just in case). I'm just trying to understand
what type of assumptions does coverity make here and so far everything
looks rather peculiar.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-17  7:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-13 23:46 Coverity: console_prepend_dropped(): Memory - corruptions coverity-bot
2023-01-14 10:14 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2023-01-16 16:35   ` Petr Mladek
2023-01-17  3:07     ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2023-01-17  7:10       ` John Ogness
2023-01-17  7:51         ` Sergey Senozhatsky [this message]
2023-01-17 11:20           ` Petr Mladek
2023-01-18  0:35             ` Sergey Senozhatsky

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