Re: [meta-virtualization][kirkstone][PATCH] lxc: backport patch to fix CVE-2022-47952

[Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>]

merged.

Bruce

In message: [meta-virtualization][kirkstone][PATCH] lxc: backport patch to fix CVE-2022-47952
on 18/01/2023 Xiangyu Chen wrote:

> From: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
> ---
>  ...ching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch | 76 +++++++++++++++++++
>  recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_git.bb             |  1 +
>  2 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 recipes-containers/lxc/files/0001-Patching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch
> 
> diff --git a/recipes-containers/lxc/files/0001-Patching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch b/recipes-containers/lxc/files/0001-Patching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..d5a02f4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/recipes-containers/lxc/files/0001-Patching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
> +From 1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Maher Azzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com>
> +Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2022 13:50:25 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH] Patching an incoming CVE (CVE-2022-47952)
> +
> +lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may
> +allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a
> +protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates
> +that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network
> +namespace path" often indicates that a file exists. NOTE: this is
> +different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was
> +based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that the
> +open() failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed";
> +however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for
> +failing except that the file does not exist.
> +
> +PoC:
> +> % ls /l
> +> ls: cannot open directory '/l': Permission denied
> +> % /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic delete lol lol /l/h/tt h h
> +> cmd/lxc_user_nic.c: 1096: main: Failed to open "/l/h/tt" <----- file does not exist.
> +> % /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic delete lol lol /l/h/t h h
> +> cmd/lxc_user_nic.c: 1101: main: Path "/l/h/t" does not refer to a network namespace path <---- file exist!
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8
> +CVE: CVE-2022-47952
> +
> +Signed-off-by: MaherAzzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com>
> +Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> +Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
> +---
> + src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c | 15 ++++++---------
> + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c b/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
> +index a91e2259d..69bc6f17d 100644
> +--- a/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
> ++++ b/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
> +@@ -1085,20 +1085,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> + 	} else if (request == LXC_USERNIC_DELETE) {
> + 		char opath[LXC_PROC_PID_FD_LEN];
> + 
> +-		/* Open the path with O_PATH which will not trigger an actual
> +-		 * open(). Don't report an errno to the caller to not leak
> +-		 * information whether the path exists or not.
> +-		 * When stracing setuid is stripped so this is not a concern
> +-		 * either.
> +-		 */
> ++		// Keep in mind CVE-2022-47952: It's crucial not to leak any
> ++		// information whether open() succeeded of failed.
> ++
> + 		netns_fd = open(args.pid, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
> + 		if (netns_fd < 0) {
> +-			usernic_error("Failed to open \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
> ++			usernic_error("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
> + 			_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + 		}
> + 
> + 		if (!fhas_fs_type(netns_fd, NSFS_MAGIC)) {
> +-			usernic_error("Path \"%s\" does not refer to a network namespace path\n", args.pid);
> ++			usernic_error("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
> + 			close(netns_fd);
> + 			_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + 		}
> +@@ -1112,7 +1109,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> + 		/* Now get an fd that we can use in setns() calls. */
> + 		ret = open(opath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> + 		if (ret < 0) {
> +-			CMD_SYSERROR("Failed to open \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
> ++			CMD_SYSERROR("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
> + 			close(netns_fd);
> + 			_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + 		}
> +-- 
> +2.34.1
> +
> diff --git a/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_git.bb b/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_git.bb
> index cecb591..71dce7d 100644
> --- a/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_git.bb
> +++ b/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_git.bb
> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/lxc/lxc.git;branch=stable-4.0;protocol=https \
>  	file://tests-our-init-is-not-busybox.patch \
>  	file://dnsmasq.conf \
>  	file://lxc-net \
> +	file://0001-Patching-an-incoming-CVE-CVE-2022-47952.patch \
>  	"
>  
>  SRCREV = "5ba5725cb4a210c25707beeca64fde5f561d1c71"
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 

> 
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