From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
"jethro@fortanix.com" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"wanpengli@tencent.com" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"b.thiel@posteo.de" <b.thiel@posteo.de>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"jmattson@google.com" <jmattson@google.com>,
"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 09:36:23 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YBrfF0XQvzQf9PhR@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f50ac476-71f2-60d4-5008-672365f4d554@intel.com>
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 2/2/21 3:56 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >> I seem to remember much stronger language in the SDM about this. I've
> >> always thought of SGX as a big unrecoverable machine-check party waiting
> >> to happen.
> >>
> >> I'll ask around internally at Intel and see what folks say. Basically,
> >> should we be afraid of a big bad EPC access?
> > If bad accesses to the EPC can cause machine checks, then EPC should never be
> > mapped into userspace, i.e. the SGX driver should never have been merged.
>
> The SDM doesn't define the behavior well enough. I'll try to get that
> fixed.
>
> But, there is some documentation of the abort page semantics:
>
> > https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx-linux/2.10/docs/Intel_SGX_Developer_Reference_Linux_2.10_Open_Source.pdf
>
> Basically, writes get dropped and reads get all 1's on all the
> implementations in the wild. I actually would have much rather gotten a
> fault, but oh well.
>
> It sounds like we need to at least modify KVM to make sure not to map
> and access EPC addresses.
Why? KVM will read garbage, but KVM needs to be careful with the data it reads,
irrespective of SGX, because the data is user/guest controlled even in the happy
case.
I'm not at all opposed to preventing KVM from accessing EPC, but I really don't
want to add a special check in KVM to avoid reading EPC. KVM generally isn't
aware of physical backings, and the relevant KVM code is shared between all
architectures.
> We might even want to add some VM_WARN_ON()s in the code that creates kernel
> mappings to catch these mappings if they happen anywhere else.
One thought for handling this would be to extend __ioremap_check_other() to flag
EPC in some way, and then disallow memremap() to EPC. A clever way to do that
without disallowing SGX's initial memremap() would be to tap into SGX's
sgx_epc_sections array, as the per-section check would activate only after each
section is initialized/map by SGX.
Disallowing memremap(), without warning, would address the KVM flow (the
memremap() in __kvm_map_gfn()) without forcing KVM to explicitly check for EPC.
E.g. something like:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index c519fc5f6948..f263f3554f27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+bool is_sgx_epc(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ resource_size_t end = addr + size - 1;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+ if (<check for overlap with sgx_epc_sections[i])
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Reset dirty EPC pages to uninitialized state. Laundry can be left with SECS
* pages whose child pages blocked EREMOVE.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 9e5ccc56f8e0..145fc6fc6bc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
*/
struct ioremap_desc {
unsigned int flags;
+ bool sgx_epc;
};
/*
@@ -110,8 +111,14 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
* The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must
* be mapped encrypted when SEV is active.
*/
-static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
+static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
+ struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
+ if (sgx_is_epc(addr, size)) {
+ desc->sgx_epc = true;
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!sev_active())
return;
@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags);
- __ioremap_check_other(addr, desc);
+ __ioremap_check_other(addr, size, desc);
}
/*
@@ -210,6 +217,13 @@ __ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
return NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * Don't allow mapping SGX EPC, it's not accessible via normal reads
+ * and writes.
+ */
+ if (io_desc.epc)
+ return NULL;
+
/*
* Mappings have to be page-aligned
*/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-03 17:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 157+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-26 9:29 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:29 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 10:10 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:34 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 23:18 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 13:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 0:01 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03 1:09 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 18:00 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-02 18:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 1:05 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 13:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:35 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-30 13:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 0:08 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page() Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-27 1:08 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 1:12 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 1:26 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 0:11 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 10:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE " Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 1:25 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 18:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 19:25 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 0:00 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 0:21 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 0:52 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:19 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 0:16 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 0:27 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 0:48 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:26 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 17:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 23:54 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 23:56 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 0:18 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27 2:02 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-30 14:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 5:38 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Kai Huang
2021-01-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 18:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-01-26 23:25 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 5:40 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 15:25 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 0:12 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 23:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 23:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 17:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 18:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 23:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03 0:49 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 22:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03 22:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 1:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04 2:59 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 3:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04 3:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04 3:20 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 14:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04 22:41 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-04 22:56 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05 2:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-05 3:00 ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-02 18:49 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 23:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 1:17 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 21:22 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-01-27 3:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-01-30 14:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 0:17 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 20:35 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 3:53 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05 0:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-05 1:39 ` Huang, Kai
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-01-30 15:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01 0:32 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 19:23 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 22:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03 0:42 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 17:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 22:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-02-03 0:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-03 1:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 9:11 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 17:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:11 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 18:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-03 19:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:29 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:45 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:11 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 2:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-01-26 9:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Kai Huang
2021-02-02 22:21 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-02 22:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 23:21 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-02 23:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 0:43 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 15:10 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 17:36 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-02-03 17:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-03 17:46 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 23:09 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-04 0:04 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 0:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 3:18 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 16:48 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 12:32 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05 16:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 22:36 ` Dave Hansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=YBrfF0XQvzQf9PhR@google.com \
--to=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=b.thiel@posteo.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
--cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.