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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com,
	venu.busireddy@oracle.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR.
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 15:20:15 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YCxTL+FYLbM0qk88@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bb86eda2963d7bef0c469c1ef8d7b32222e3a145.1612398155.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

On Thu, Feb 04, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> index 950afebfba88..f6bfa138874f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
>  #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD	13
>  #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT	14
>  #define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID	15
> +#define KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION	16
>  
>  #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME      0
>  
> @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@
>  #define MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL	0x4b564d05
>  #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT	0x4b564d06
>  #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK	0x4b564d07
> +#define MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION	0x4b564d08
>  
>  struct kvm_steal_time {
>  	__u64 steal;
> @@ -136,4 +138,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data {
>  #define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK
>  #define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0
>  
> +#define KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED BIT_ULL(0)
> +
>  #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b0d324aed515..93f42b3d3e33 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1627,6 +1627,16 @@ int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data)
> +{

I don't see the point for a helper.  It's actually going to make the code
less readable once proper error handling is added.  Given that it's not static
and exposed via svm.h, without an external user, I assume this got left behind
when the implicit enabling was removed.

> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))

I 100% agree with Steve, this needs to check guest_cpuid_has() in addition to
sev_guest().  And it should return '1', i.e. signal #GP to the guest, not
silently eat the bad WRMSR.

> +		return;
> +
> +	sev->live_migration_enabled = !!(data & KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION_ENABLED);

The value needs to be checked as well, i.e. all bits except LIVE_MIGRATION...
should to be reserved to zero.

> +}
> +
>  int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm,
>  			      struct kvm_shared_pages_list *list)
>  {
> @@ -1639,6 +1649,9 @@ int svm_get_shared_pages_list(struct kvm *kvm,
>  	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  
> +	if (!sev->live_migration_enabled)
> +		return -EINVAL;

EINVAL is a weird return value for something that is controlled by the guest,
especially since it's possible for the guest to support migration, just not
yet.  EBUSY maybe?  EOPNOTSUPP?

> +
>  	if (!list->size)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 58f89f83caab..43ea5061926f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -2903,6 +2903,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>  		svm->msr_decfg = data;
>  		break;
>  	}
> +	case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION:
> +		sev_update_migration_flags(vcpu->kvm, data);
> +		break;

There shuld be a svm_get_msr() entry as well, I don't see any reason to prevent
the guest from reading the MSR.

>  	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
>  		if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
>  			avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
> @@ -3976,6 +3979,19 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  			vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f));
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If SEV guest then enable the Live migration feature.
> +	 */
> +	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> +		struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
> +
> +		best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0);
> +		if (!best)
> +			return;
> +
> +		best->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION);

Again echoing Steve's concern, userspace is the ultimate authority on what
features are exposed to the VM.  I don't see any motivation for forcing live
migration to be enabled.

And as I believe was pointed out elsewhere, this bit needs to be advertised to
userspace via kvm_cpu_caps.

> +	}
> +
>  	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 066ca2a9f1e6..e1bffc11e425 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>  	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
>  	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
>  	u64 ap_jump_table;	/* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
> +	bool live_migration_enabled;
>  	/* List and count of shared pages */
>  	int shared_pages_list_count;
>  	struct list_head shared_pages_list;
> @@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
>  void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
>  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
>  void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
> +void sev_update_migration_flags(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data);
>  void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
>  int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-16 23:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-04  0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05  1:44   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:32     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17  1:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18  6:48         ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05             ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15                     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54                     ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59                           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02  1:40                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09                               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 10:40                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32                         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10  3:42                           ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10  3:47                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48                       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17  1:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05  0:56   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:07     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  2:54       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06  4:49         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  5:46         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08  0:28             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36                 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01                   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05                     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  4:10   ` kernel test robot
2021-02-04  4:10     ` kernel test robot
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra
2021-02-09  6:23   ` kernel test robot
2021-02-09  6:23     ` kernel test robot

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