From: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
To: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Cc: "openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org" <openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org>,
Kun Zhao <zkxz@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: overlayFS security concern
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:50:24 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YDE90CWoSXCHjgYK@heinlein> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3803c1a3-bee8-4e78-a23f-7e50858eda1a@beta.fastmail.com>
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On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 11:46:08AM +1030, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> On Sat, 20 Feb 2021, at 11:01, Kun Zhao wrote:
> > 2. don’t use overlayFS (but it’s really useful for debugging during
> > develop, and configuration management)
>
> Possibly, but it's probably worth looking at IMA instead:
IMA (or similar) is likely a good option.
There is also work going on to remove 'root' from many users and
daemons so it should be harder to overwrite executables. If you
have root I'm pretty sure you can always subvert even something like
IMA.
A protection we could do which would make attacks slightly harder
than they are today would be to change how we mount OverlayFS. Right
now we mount it on top of root, but we could be more explicit about
mounting it only on top of places we expect to be read-write. `/etc`
and `/var` are the two that come to mind but I'm sure there are others.
This shouldn't be very difficult to implement for someone wanting to
take the initiative.
--
Patrick Williams
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-20 16:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-20 0:31 overlayFS security concern Kun Zhao
2021-02-20 0:52 ` chunhui.jia
2021-02-20 1:13 ` Kun Zhao
2021-02-20 1:17 ` chunhui.jia
2021-02-20 1:16 ` Andrew Jeffery
2021-02-20 16:50 ` Patrick Williams [this message]
2021-02-20 22:29 ` Michael Richardson
2021-02-23 5:22 ` Lei Yu
2021-02-23 5:49 ` Milton Miller II
2021-02-22 17:36 ` overlayFS security concern - threat model Joseph Reynolds
2021-03-03 17:55 ` Kun Zhao
2021-03-03 18:00 ` Joseph Reynolds
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