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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/uaccess: small optimization in unsafe_copy_to_user()
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2021 18:09:44 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YHskaCSFOE1AYyoP@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjYVZZpqDGH2Q=kMOyOqBhpbt8t8JdEWZHDGrPiV=_ifA@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Apr 17, 2021 at 09:27:04AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 17, 2021 at 9:08 AM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Side note: I'm, looking at the readdir cases that I wrote, and I have
> > to just say that is broken too. So "stones and glass houses" etc, and
> > I'll have to fix that too.
> 
> In particular, the very very old OLD_READDIR interface that only fills
> in one dirent at a time didn't call verify_dirent_name(). Same for the
> compat version.
> 
> This requires a corrupt filesystem to be an issue (and even then,
> most/all would have the length of a directory entry in an 'unsigned
> char', so even corrupt filesystems would generally never have a
> negative name length).
> 
> So I don't think it's an issue in _practice_, but at the same time it
> is very much an example of the same issue that put_cmsg() has in
> net-next: unsafe user copies should be fully guarded and not have some
> "but this would never happen because callers would never do anything
> bad".
> 
> Al - fairly trivial patch applied, comments?

Should be fine...  FWIW, I've a patch in the same area, making those suckers
return bool.  Seeing that they are only ever called via dir_emit(), dir_emit_dot()
and dir_emit_dotdot() and all of those return ->actor(...) == 0...

Anyway, that'd be trivial to rebase on top of yours.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-17 18:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-16 19:24 [PATCH] x86/uaccess: small optimization in unsafe_copy_to_user() Eric Dumazet
2021-04-16 19:44 ` Al Viro
2021-04-16 20:11   ` Eric Dumazet
2021-04-16 20:57     ` Eric Dumazet
2021-04-17 13:59   ` David Laight
2021-04-17 16:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-04-17 16:08   ` Linus Torvalds
2021-04-17 16:27     ` Linus Torvalds
2021-04-17 18:09       ` Al Viro [this message]
2021-04-17 20:30         ` Al Viro
2021-04-17 20:35           ` Al Viro
2021-04-17 22:11             ` Linus Torvalds
2021-04-18  0:50               ` Al Viro
2021-04-17 19:44   ` Eric Dumazet
2021-04-17 19:51     ` Linus Torvalds

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