All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] crypto: arc4: Implement a version optimized for memory usage
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 12:36:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YJGiNcorcgAcmAnb@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d523902e-744c-1291-aee8-9be734f2a3ce@wanadoo.fr>

On Tue, May 04, 2021 at 07:59:38PM +0200, Christophe JAILLET wrote:
> Le 04/05/2021 à 18:57, Eric Biggers a écrit :
> > On Sun, May 02, 2021 at 09:29:46PM +0200, Christophe JAILLET wrote:
> > > +#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
> > > +#define S_type	u8
> > > +#else
> > > +#define S_type	u32
> > > +#endif
> > > +
> > >   struct arc4_ctx {
> > > -	u32 S[256];
> > > +	S_type S[256];
> > >   	u32 x, y;
> > >   };
> > 
> > Is it actually useful to keep both versions?  It seems we could just use the u8
> > version everywhere.  Note that there aren't actually any unaligned memory
> > accesses, so choosing the version conditionally on
> > CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS seems odd.  What are you trying to
> > determine by checking that?
> 
> Hi, this is a bad interpretation from me.
> 
> I thought that S[1] would likely use an odd address and would trigger an
> unaligned access. But as we would read only 1 byte, this is not the case.
> 
> Looking at [1], we have : "At this point, it should be clear that accessing
> a single byte (u8 or char) will never cause an unaligned access, because all
> memory addresses are evenly divisible by one."
> 
> 
> I wanted to avoid potential performance cost related to using char (i.e u8)
> instead of int (i.e. u32).
> On some architecture this could require some shift or masking or whatever to
> "unpack" the values of S.
> 
> 
> [1]:
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.html
> 
> CJ
> 

arc4 is an insecure cipher which is only supported for use in legacy protocols.
So we don't really need to worry about optimizing performance on every
architecture.  If the byte-based version is *usually* faster as well as uses
less memory, we probably should just use it everywhere.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-04 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-02 19:29 [RFC PATCH] crypto: arc4: Implement a version optimized for memory usage Christophe JAILLET
2021-05-04 16:57 ` Eric Biggers
2021-05-04 17:59   ` Christophe JAILLET
2021-05-04 19:36     ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2021-05-05 10:20     ` David Laight

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YJGiNcorcgAcmAnb@gmail.com \
    --to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.