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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch V2 02/14] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig()
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 10:49:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YL3dfjIM9YHTW5S2@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210606001323.067157324@linutronix.de>

On Sun, Jun 06, 2021 at 01:47:44AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> The non-compacted slowpath uses __copy_from_user() and copies the entire
> user buffer into the kernel buffer, verbatim.  This means that the kernel
> buffer may now contain entirely invalid state on which XRSTOR will #GP.
> validate_user_xstate_header() can detect some of that corruption, but that
> leaves the onus on callers to clear the buffer.
> 
> Prior to XSAVES support it was possible just to reinitialize the buffer,
> completely, but with supervisor states that is not longer possible as the
> buffer clearing code split got it backwards. Fixing that is possible, but
> not corrupting the state in the first place is more robust.
> 
> Avoid corruption of the kernel XSAVE buffer by using copy_user_to_xstate()
> which validates the XSAVE header contents before copying the actual states
> to the kernel. copy_user_to_xstate() was previously only called for
> compacted-format kernel buffers, but it works for both compacted and
> non-compacted forms.
> 
> Using it for the non-compacted form is slower because of multiple
> __copy_from_user() operations, but that cost is less important than robust
> code in an already slow path.
> 
> [ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]
> 
> Fixes: b860eb8dce59 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Define new functions for clearing fpregs and xstates")
> Reported-by: syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> V2: Removed the make validate_user_xstate_header() static hunks (Borislav)
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c |    9 +--------
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

Very nice.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-07  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-05 23:47 [patch V2 00/14] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 01/14] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 02/14] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07  8:49   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 03/14] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 04/14] x86/pkru: Make the fpinit state update work Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 05/14] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 06/14] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 19:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 07/14] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 08/14] x86/fpu: Move inlines where they belong Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 09/14] x86/cpu: Sanitize X86_FEATURE_OSPKE Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 10/14] x86/fpu: Rename fpu__clear_all() to fpu_flush_thread() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 11/14] x86/pkru: Provide pkru_get_init_value() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 12/14] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 13/14] x86/fpu: Rename xstate copy functions which are related to UABI Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 14/14] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_uabi_from_user/kernel_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 13:02 ` [patch V2 00/14] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 13:36   ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-07 14:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 16:38       ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-07 22:51         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 14:47           ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-08 11:17         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 12:27           ` Thomas Gleixner

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