From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jon Grimm <jon.grimm@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>,
Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 10:51:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YPff9IMQFC599N4+@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210720220113.GA535804@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 03:01:13PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 12:54:16PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> > I did not see any #VE implementation to handle SEPT violations when a
> > page is in PENDING state. I am assuming that this needs to be
> > supported at some point (If not then we need to discuss the use cases
> > for such support).
>
> We actually plan to disable those #VEs, to avoid any problems with
> the system call gap. Instead the plan is that the kernel will know
> in advance what memory has been accepted or not, and accept it before
> touching.
This confuses me a bit, what happens when the VMM is malicious and
re-maps an already accepted page and the TD tries to access it?
My thinking was that this causes a #VE, but what happens instead when
this #VE can be disabled?
Regards,
Joerg
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-21 8:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-19 12:58 Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 13:07 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-07-19 15:02 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 20:39 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 8:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 9:34 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-20 11:50 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 0:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20 1:51 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 2:00 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 3:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20 19:54 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 22:01 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:55 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21 0:35 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-21 8:51 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2021-07-20 5:17 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 9:11 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 17:32 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:09 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21 0:38 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-22 17:31 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-26 18:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 8:44 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 14:14 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-20 17:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 9:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:22 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:53 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21 9:25 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21 10:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:48 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-22 15:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-26 19:02 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-27 9:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-02 10:19 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 18:47 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 15:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 19:51 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-23 15:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-23 16:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-25 9:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-25 18:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 10:00 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-26 11:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 19:13 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-26 23:02 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-26 23:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-27 1:35 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-23 11:04 ` Varad Gautam
2021-07-23 14:34 ` Kaplan, David
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