All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Jane Malalane <jane.malalane@citrix.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 21:37:07 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YW3M40tOILjI3DiD@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YW3LJdztZom+xQHv@google.com>

On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 07:29:41PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> This isn't correct.  When running as a guest, the intended behavior is to fully
> trust the CPUID.0x80000021 bit.

Really? Because I'm coming from an SEV-SNP mail thread where we don't
trust the HV at all and we even hand in a CPUID page into the guest...

:-P

> If bit 6 is set, yay, the hypervisor has told the kernel that it
> will only ever run on hardware without the bug. If bit 6 is clear
> and HYPERVISOR is true, then the FMS crud can't be trusted because
> the kernel _may_ run on affected hardware in the future even if the
> current underlying hardware is not affected.

Ok, I see, then the CPUID check needs to go first, makes sense.

> I agree.  If the argument for this patch is that the kernel can be migrated to
> older hardware, then it stands to reason that the kernel could also be migrated
> to a different CPU vendor entirely.  E.g. start on Intel, migrate to Zen1, kaboom.

Migration across vendors? Really, that works?

I'll believe it only when I see it with my own eyes.

:-)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-18 19:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-13 14:22 [PATCH v2] x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL Jane Malalane
2021-10-13 16:46 ` Greg KH
2021-10-18 18:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-18 19:10   ` H. Peter Anvin
2021-10-18 19:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-18 19:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-10-18 19:37     ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-10-18 20:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-10-18 20:18         ` Andrew Cooper
2021-10-18 20:06   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-10-18 21:46     ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YW3M40tOILjI3DiD@zn.tnic \
    --to=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jane.malalane@citrix.com \
    --cc=kim.phillips@amd.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=puwen@hygon.cn \
    --cc=ray.huang@amd.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.