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From: Lang Yu <Lang.Yu@amd.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm/kmemleak: Avoid scanning potential huge holes
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 21:51:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YZJl2nyumpEad9iw@lang-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211108140029.721144-1-lang.yu@amd.com>

Ping for review. Thanks!

On Mon, Nov 08, 2021 at 10:00:29PM +0800, Lang Yu wrote:
> When using devm_request_free_mem_region() and devm_memremap_pages()
> to add ZONE_DEVICE memory, if requested free mem region's end pfn
> were huge(e.g., 0x400000000), the node_end_pfn() will be also huge
> (see move_pfn_range_to_zone()). Thus it creates a huge hole between
> node_start_pfn() and node_end_pfn().
> 
> We found on some AMD APUs, amdkfd requested such a free mem region
> and created a huge hole. In such a case, following code snippet was
> just doing busy test_bit() looping on the huge hole.
> 
> for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
> 	struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
> 		if (!page)
> 			continue;
> 	...
> }
> 
> So we got a soft lockup:
> 
> watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 26s! [bash:1221]
> CPU: 6 PID: 1221 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.15.0-custom #1
> RIP: 0010:pfn_to_online_page+0x5/0xd0
> Call Trace:
>   ? kmemleak_scan+0x16a/0x440
>   kmemleak_write+0x306/0x3a0
>   ? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
>   full_proxy_write+0x5c/0x90
>   vfs_write+0xb9/0x260
>   ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
>   __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
>   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> 
> I did some tests with the patch.
> 
> (1) amdgpu module unloaded
> 
> before the patch:
> 
> real    0m0.976s
> user    0m0.000s
> sys     0m0.968s
> 
> after the patch:
> 
> real    0m0.981s
> user    0m0.000s
> sys     0m0.973s
> 
> (2) amdgpu module loaded
> 
> before the patch:
> 
> real    0m35.365s
> user    0m0.000s
> sys     0m35.354s
> 
> after the patch:
> 
> real    0m1.049s
> user    0m0.000s
> sys     0m1.042s
> 
> v2:
> - Only scan pages belonging to the zone.(David Hildenbrand)
> - Use __maybe_unused to make compilers happy.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Lang Yu <lang.yu@amd.com>
> ---
>  mm/kmemleak.c | 13 +++++++------
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/kmemleak.c b/mm/kmemleak.c
> index b57383c17cf6..adbe5aa01184 100644
> --- a/mm/kmemleak.c
> +++ b/mm/kmemleak.c
> @@ -1403,7 +1403,8 @@ static void kmemleak_scan(void)
>  {
>  	unsigned long flags;
>  	struct kmemleak_object *object;
> -	int i;
> +	struct zone *zone;
> +	int __maybe_unused i;
>  	int new_leaks = 0;
>  
>  	jiffies_last_scan = jiffies;
> @@ -1443,9 +1444,9 @@ static void kmemleak_scan(void)
>  	 * Struct page scanning for each node.
>  	 */
>  	get_online_mems();
> -	for_each_online_node(i) {
> -		unsigned long start_pfn = node_start_pfn(i);
> -		unsigned long end_pfn = node_end_pfn(i);
> +	for_each_populated_zone(zone) {
> +		unsigned long start_pfn = zone->zone_start_pfn;
> +		unsigned long end_pfn = zone_end_pfn(zone);
>  		unsigned long pfn;
>  
>  		for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
> @@ -1454,8 +1455,8 @@ static void kmemleak_scan(void)
>  			if (!page)
>  				continue;
>  
> -			/* only scan pages belonging to this node */
> -			if (page_to_nid(page) != i)
> +			/* only scan pages belonging to this zone */
> +			if (page_zone(page) != zone)
>  				continue;
>  			/* only scan if page is in use */
>  			if (page_count(page) == 0)
> -- 
> 2.25.1
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-15 13:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-08 14:00 [PATCH v2] mm/kmemleak: Avoid scanning potential huge holes Lang Yu
2021-11-15 13:51 ` Lang Yu [this message]
2021-11-24  2:58 ` Lang Yu
2021-11-24  9:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-11-24 10:31   ` Lang Yu
2022-01-28 19:29 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-02-01  0:51   ` Andrew Morton
2022-02-03 14:55     ` Catalin Marinas

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