From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [112.213.38.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 870E6C433EF for ; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:30:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4Jgnvp5yH2z3bcZ for ; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 18:30:14 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=pI1ceGoV; dkim-atps=neutral Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linuxfoundation.org (client-ip=139.178.84.217; helo=dfw.source.kernel.org; envelope-from=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=pI1ceGoV; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4Jgnv35JS9z2ynt for ; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 18:29:34 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 862CE60906; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:29:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0D2B9C004E1; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:29:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1642836570; bh=cMWRKsI8TI2NHT84jTQS/VsDVS8oI5QJbf0MXIj7kt0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=pI1ceGoVu3CvLVt/6heTjt81u7y+XDx/Uw6BOOSObPJW4WPvVtM5NhbPo6poe2GPQ tdZKznbXRQN+CEn4N451Wc8DtVhEyKoAlz4/PwX2FXWc6KDagqwQgHn9TU7nRGlxrr UIb/aGYJKpTrwLWT6QFH4a5O2fl+WFVq49KXzpCM= Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 08:29:21 +0100 From: Greg KH To: Nayna Jain Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] powerpc/pseries: add support for local secure storage called Platform Keystore(PKS) Message-ID: References: <20220122005637.28199-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220122005637.28199-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Douglas Miller , George Wilson , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, gjoyce@ibm.com, Daniel Axtens Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 07:56:35PM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > PowerVM provides an isolated Platform Keystore(PKS) storage allocation > for each partition with individually managed access controls to store > sensitive information securely. Linux Kernel can access this storage by > interfacing with hypervisor using a new set of hypervisor calls. > > PowerVM guest secure boot intend to use Platform Keystore for the > purpose of storing public keys. Secure boot requires public keys to > be able to verify the grub and boot kernel. To allow authenticated > manipulation of keys, it supports variables to store key authorities > - PK/KEK and code signing keys - db. It also supports denied list to > disallow booting even if signed with valid key. This is done via > denied list database - dbx or sbat. These variables would be stored in > PKS, and are managed and controlled by firmware. > > The purpose of this patchset is to add support for users to > read/write/add/delete variables required for secure boot on PowerVM. Ok, this is like the 3rd or 4th different platform-specific proposal for this type of functionality. I think we need to give up on platform-specific user/kernel apis on this (random sysfs/securityfs files scattered around the tree), and come up with a standard place for all of this. Please work with the other developers of the other drivers for this to make this unified so that userspace has a chance to use this in a sane manner. thanks, greg k-h From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 902C5C433EF for ; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:29:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233549AbiAVH3c (ORCPT ); Sat, 22 Jan 2022 02:29:32 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org ([139.178.84.217]:54488 "EHLO dfw.source.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230174AbiAVH3c (ORCPT ); Sat, 22 Jan 2022 02:29:32 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 88E8560915 for ; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:29:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0D2B9C004E1; Sat, 22 Jan 2022 07:29:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1642836570; bh=cMWRKsI8TI2NHT84jTQS/VsDVS8oI5QJbf0MXIj7kt0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=pI1ceGoVu3CvLVt/6heTjt81u7y+XDx/Uw6BOOSObPJW4WPvVtM5NhbPo6poe2GPQ tdZKznbXRQN+CEn4N451Wc8DtVhEyKoAlz4/PwX2FXWc6KDagqwQgHn9TU7nRGlxrr UIb/aGYJKpTrwLWT6QFH4a5O2fl+WFVq49KXzpCM= Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 08:29:21 +0100 From: Greg KH To: Nayna Jain Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Michael Ellerman , Daniel Axtens , George Wilson , Douglas Miller , gjoyce@ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] powerpc/pseries: add support for local secure storage called Platform Keystore(PKS) Message-ID: References: <20220122005637.28199-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220122005637.28199-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 07:56:35PM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > PowerVM provides an isolated Platform Keystore(PKS) storage allocation > for each partition with individually managed access controls to store > sensitive information securely. Linux Kernel can access this storage by > interfacing with hypervisor using a new set of hypervisor calls. > > PowerVM guest secure boot intend to use Platform Keystore for the > purpose of storing public keys. Secure boot requires public keys to > be able to verify the grub and boot kernel. To allow authenticated > manipulation of keys, it supports variables to store key authorities > - PK/KEK and code signing keys - db. It also supports denied list to > disallow booting even if signed with valid key. This is done via > denied list database - dbx or sbat. These variables would be stored in > PKS, and are managed and controlled by firmware. > > The purpose of this patchset is to add support for users to > read/write/add/delete variables required for secure boot on PowerVM. Ok, this is like the 3rd or 4th different platform-specific proposal for this type of functionality. I think we need to give up on platform-specific user/kernel apis on this (random sysfs/securityfs files scattered around the tree), and come up with a standard place for all of this. Please work with the other developers of the other drivers for this to make this unified so that userspace has a chance to use this in a sane manner. thanks, greg k-h