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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	lkft-triage@lists.linaro.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: RETBleed: WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 11:40:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ys/kfDk7mVE09N3L@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Ys/bWIk0F5srkkpF@kroah.com>

On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 11:01:12AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 02:15:07PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> > 
> > We are booting the i386 kernel on an x86 machine.
> > With Spectre V2 patches merged into Linux mainline we have been noticing
> > RETBleed: WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to
> > RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!
> 
> That's funny.  I don't think that's a valid combination that should be
> cared about, but I'll leave it to Pawan to comment if it is something
> that is "real" to be concerned for.

Yeah, so far nobody cared to fix 32bit. If someone *realllllly* cares
and wants to put the effort in I suppose I'll review the patches, but
seriously, you shouldn't be running 32bit kernels on Skylake / Zen based
systems, that's just silly.

  reply	other threads:[~2022-07-14  9:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-14  8:45 RETBleed: WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible! Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-14  9:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-14  9:40   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-07-15 22:19   ` Pawan Gupta
2022-07-23 21:50   ` Adam Borowski
2022-07-24  9:25     ` Jan Engelhardt
2022-07-24 12:30       ` Adam Borowski

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