All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, james.morse@arm.com,
	robin.murphy@arm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: uaccess: simplify uaccess_mask_ptr()
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 11:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yy2LxmNAGybHHCn6@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220922205545.GA12945@willie-the-truck>

On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 09:55:46PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 04:10:53PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index 2fc9f0861769a..e69559826cb8c 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -203,9 +203,11 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void)
> >  }
> >  
> >  /*
> > - * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the maximum
> > - * user address. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), untag
> > - * the pointer before checking.
> > + * Sanitize a uaccess pointer such that it cannot reach any kernel address.
> > + *
> > + * Clearing bit 55 ensures the pointer cannot address any portion of the TTBR1
> > + * address range (i.e. any kernel address), and either the pointer falls within
> > + * the TTBR0 address range or must cause a fault.
> >   */
> >  #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr)
> >  static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
> > @@ -213,12 +215,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
> >  	void __user *safe_ptr;
> >  
> >  	asm volatile(
> > -	"	bics	xzr, %3, %2\n"
> > -	"	csel	%0, %1, xzr, eq\n"
> > -	: "=&r" (safe_ptr)
> > -	: "r" (ptr), "r" (TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1),
> > -	  "r" (untagged_addr(ptr))
> > -	: "cc");
> > +	"	bic	%0, %1, %2\n"
> > +	: "=r" (safe_ptr)
> > +	: "r" (ptr),
> > +	  "i" (BIT(55))
> > +	);
> >  
> >  	csdb();
> 
> Why do we still need the CSDB after your change?

Good point, we no longer do a check against TASK_SIZE so no need for
flags prediction (IIRC that was the reason for CSDB).

-- 
Catalin

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-23 10:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-22 15:10 [PATCH] arm64: uaccess: simplify uaccess_mask_ptr() Mark Rutland
2022-09-22 16:46 ` Robin Murphy
2022-09-22 20:55 ` Will Deacon
2022-09-23 10:34   ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2022-09-23 12:29   ` Mark Rutland
2022-09-23 17:26 ` Catalin Marinas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Yy2LxmNAGybHHCn6@arm.com \
    --to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.