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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	 tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	 dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@kernel.org,  peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 08:01:23 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z73pU45jzA8e2i0S@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <edcdad12-bbb7-46b9-8914-9bbb36b44597@zytor.com>

On Fri, Oct 25, 2024, Xin Li wrote:
> On 10/24/2024 12:49 AM, Chao Gao wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 30, 2024 at 10:01:04PM -0700, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> > > From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> > > 
> > > Set VMX CPU capabilities before initializing nested instead of after,
> > > as it needs to check VMX CPU capabilities to setup the VMX basic MSR
> > > for nested.
> > 
> > Which VMX CPU capabilities are needed? after reading patch 25, I still
> > don't get that.

Heh, I had the same question.  I was worried this was fixing a bug.

> Sigh, in v2 I had 'if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED))' in
> nested_vmx_setup_basic(), which is changed to 'if (cpu_has_vmx_fred())'
> in v3.  So the reason for the change is gone.  But I think logically
> the change is still needed; nested setup should be after VMX setup.

Hmm, no, I don't think we want to allow nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() to consume
any "output" from vmx_set_cpu_caps().  vmx_set_cpu_caps() is called only on the
CPU that loads kvm-intel.ko, whereas nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() is called on
all CPUs to check for consistency between CPUs.

And thinking more about the relevant flows, there's a flaw with kvm_cpu_caps and
vendor module reload.  KVM zeroes kvm_cpu_caps during init, but not until
kvm_set_cpu_caps() is called, i.e. quite some time after KVM has started doing
setup.  If KVM had a bug where it checked a feature kvm_set_cpu_caps(), the bug
could potentially go unnoticed until just the "right" combination of hardware,
module params, and/or Kconfig exposed semi-uninitialized data.

I'll post the below (assuming it actually works) to guard against that.  Ideally,
kvm_cpu_cap_get() would WARN if it's used before caps are finalized, but I don't
think the extra protection would be worth the increase in code footprint.

--
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 97a90689a9dc..8fd48119bd41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -817,7 +817,8 @@ do {                                                                        \
 
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
-       memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
+       WARN_ON_ONCE(!bitmap_empty((void *)kvm_cpu_caps,
+                                  sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) * BITS_PER_BYTE));
 
        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
                     sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index f5685f153e08..075a07412893 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9737,6 +9737,7 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
        }
 
        memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps));
+       memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
 
        x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
        if (!x86_emulator_cache) {

  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-25 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-01  5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21  8:28   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-21 17:03     ` Xin Li
2024-10-22  2:47       ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:30         ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  8:48   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12   ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18       ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  9:06   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-26 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  6:46         ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  6:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:02             ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:32                 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:58                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  6:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  8:04     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  6:33       ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05  7:16         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:18   ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48     ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:23   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:49   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:34     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:42   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:25     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  9:07       ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40           ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19  0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48         ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson

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