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From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/msr: expose MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE on AMD
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 14:52:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z7iFM_49F47St5gZ@macbook.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <30a21ae6-14a0-4069-a715-e8b906169199@citrix.com>

On Fri, Feb 21, 2025 at 12:34:21PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 21/02/2025 12:04 pm, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
> > The MMIO_CONF_BASE reports the base of the MCFG range on AMD systems.
> > Currently Linux is unconditionally attempting to read the MSR without a
> > safe MSR accessor, and since Xen doesn't allow access to it Linux reports
> > the following error:
> >
> > unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0xc0010058 at rIP: 0xffffffff8101d19f (xen_do_read_msr+0x7f/0xa0)
> > Call Trace:
> >  <TASK>
> >  ? ex_handler_msr+0x11e/0x150
> >  ? fixup_exception+0x81/0x300
> >  ? exc_general_protection+0x138/0x410
> >  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
> >  ? xen_do_read_msr+0x7f/0xa0
> >  xen_read_msr+0x1e/0x30
> >  amd_get_mmconfig_range+0x2b/0x80
> >  quirk_amd_mmconfig_area+0x28/0x100
> >  ? quirk_system_pci_resources+0x2b/0x150
> >  pnp_fixup_device+0x39/0x50
> >  __pnp_add_device+0xf/0x150
> >  pnp_add_device+0x3d/0x100
> >  ? __pfx_pnpacpi_allocated_resource+0x10/0x10
> >  ? __pfx_pnpacpi_allocated_resource+0x10/0x10
> >  ? acpi_walk_resources+0xbb/0xd0
> >  pnpacpi_add_device_handler+0x1f9/0x280
> >  acpi_ns_get_device_callback+0x104/0x1c0
> >  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x20
> >  ? down_timeout+0x3a/0x60
> >  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x40
> >  acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x1d0/0x260
> >  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x20
> >  ? __pfx_acpi_ns_get_device_callback+0x10/0x10
> >  acpi_get_devices+0x8a/0xb0
> >  ? __pfx_pnpacpi_add_device_handler+0x10/0x10
> >  ? __pfx_pnpacpi_init+0x10/0x10
> >  pnpacpi_init+0x50/0x80
> >  do_one_initcall+0x46/0x2e0
> >  kernel_init_freeable+0x1da/0x2f0
> >  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
> >  kernel_init+0x16/0x1b0
> >  ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
> >  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
> >  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
> >  </TASK>
> >
> > Fix by allowing access to the MSR on AMD systems, returning 0 for
> > unprivileged domains (MMIO configuration space disabled), and the native
> > value for the hardware domain.
> >
> > The non hardware domain logic will need to be adjusted if in the future we
> > expose an MCFG region to such domains.
> >
> > Write attempts to the MSR will still result in #GP for all domain types.
> >
> > Fixes: 84e848fd7a16 ('x86/hvm: disallow access to unknown MSRs')
> > Fixes: 322ec7c89f66 ('x86/pv: disallow access to unknown MSRs')
> > Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> > ---
> >  xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
> > index 289cf10b783a..c588c9131337 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
> > @@ -245,6 +245,21 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
> >          *val = 0;
> >          break;
> >  
> > +    case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
> > +        if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
> > +            goto gp_fault;
> > +
> > +        /*
> > +         * Report MMIO configuration space is disabled unconditionally for
> > +         * domUs, as the emulated chipset doesn't support ECAM.  For dom0
> > +         * return the hardware value.
> > +         */
> > +        *val = 0;
> > +        if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && rdmsr_safe(msr, *val) )
> > +            goto gp_fault;
> > +
> > +        break;
> > +
> >      case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
> >          if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd )
> >              goto gp_fault;
> 
> Looking at the linux code, can we not fix this just by turning it into a
> rdmsr_safe(), noting that not all hypervisors virtualise this MSR?

Well, for dom0 it would be best if we expose it.  For domU it would be
fine to use rdmsr_safe() in Linux.

> Given the number of VMs which genuinely don't have PCI (emulated or
> otherwise), it's a buggy assumption in Linux.

I think we need to expose for the hardware domain, at which point
returning all 0s for domUs is kind of a very small nit.

I agree that Linux should use rdmsr_safe(), I can send a patch to that
effect, but I still think there's no harm in returning all 0s on domUs
instead of #GP.

Thanks, Roger.


  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-21 13:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-21 12:04 [PATCH] x86/msr: expose MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE on AMD Roger Pau Monne
2025-02-21 12:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-21 13:52   ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2025-02-21 12:44 ` Jan Beulich
2025-02-21 14:05   ` Roger Pau Monné

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