From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Derek Manwaring <derekmn@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 19:45:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z88zM52t8b1oSfr2@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310164023.779191-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
* David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> wrote:
> David Kaplan (36):
> x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation
> x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation()
> x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation
> x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel
> x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation
> x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation
> Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls
> cpu: Define attack vectors
> x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support
> x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector
> controls.
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf
> x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso
> x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti
> x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
> cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs
Just an overall meta comment: could you please capitalize all the
acronyms properly and consistently in titles, changelogs and the code
itself:
s/mds
/MDS
s/srso
/SRSO
etc. For single patches we maintainers will routinely fix such issues,
but for a 36-patch series it's rather tedious ...
Also, please put no periods into titles, and titles should begin with a
verb.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-10 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-10 16:39 [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 01/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 02/36] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-13 9:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-13 14:19 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-13 19:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 14:16 ` MMIO and VERW Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:25 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 16:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:56 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 18:15 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 9:29 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-25 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 04/36] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 16:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 05/36] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 06/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 07/36] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 08/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 09/36] x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 10/36] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-12 9:49 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-10 16:26 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-10 16:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:56 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 12/36] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 13/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:25 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 14/36] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 15/36] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 16/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:12 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:14 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 15:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 16:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 16:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 17:06 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 18/36] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:12 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 19/36] x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 20/36] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-12 11:32 ` kernel test robot
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 21/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 22/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 23/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 24/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 25/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 26/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 27/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 28/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 29/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 30/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 31/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 32/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 33/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 34/36] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 35/36] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 36/36] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-03-10 18:45 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2025-03-10 20:46 ` [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls Kaplan, David
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