From: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
davem@davemloft.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: handling unsupported optlen in cgroup bpf getsockopt: (was [PATCH net-next v4 2/4] net: socket: add sockopts blacklist for BPF cgroup hook)
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2023 09:47:47 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZD7Js4fj5YyI2oLd@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a4591e85-d58b-0efd-c8a4-2652dc69ff68@linux.dev>
On 04/17, Martin KaFai Lau wrote:
> On 4/14/23 6:55 PM, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > On 04/13, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 7:38 AM Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
> > > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 4:22 PM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 3:35 PM Alexander Mikhalitsyn
> > > > > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > During work on SO_PEERPIDFD, it was discovered (thanks to Christian),
> > > > > > that bpf cgroup hook can cause FD leaks when used with sockopts which
> > > > > > install FDs into the process fdtable.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > After some offlist discussion it was proposed to add a blacklist of
> > > > >
> > > > > We try to replace this word by either denylist or blocklist, even in changelogs.
> > > >
> > > > Hi Eric,
> > > >
> > > > Oh, I'm sorry about that. :( Sure.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > socket options those can cause troubles when BPF cgroup hook is enabled.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Can we find the appropriate Fixes: tag to help stable teams ?
> > > >
> > > > Sure, I will add next time.
> > > >
> > > > Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
> > > >
> > > > I think it's better to add Stanislav Fomichev to CC.
> > >
> > > Can we use 'struct proto' bpf_bypass_getsockopt instead? We already
> > > use it for tcp zerocopy, I'm assuming it should work in this case as
> > > well?
> >
> > Jakub reminded me of the other things I wanted to ask here bug forgot:
> >
> > - setsockopt is probably not needed, right? setsockopt hook triggers
> > before the kernel and shouldn't leak anything
> > - for getsockopt, instead of bypassing bpf completely, should we instead
> > ignore the error from the bpf program? that would still preserve
> > the observability aspect
>
> stealing this thread to discuss the optlen issue which may make sense to
> bypass also.
>
> There has been issue with optlen. Other than this older post related to
> optlen > PAGE_SIZE:
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/5c8b7d59-1f28-2284-f7b9-49d946f2e982@linux.dev/,
> the recent one related to optlen that we have seen is
> NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS. The userspace passed in optlen == 0 and the kernel
> put the expected optlen (> 0) and 'return 0;' to userspace. The userspace
> intention is to learn the expected optlen. This makes 'ctx.optlen >
> max_optlen' and __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt() ends up returning
> -EFAULT to the userspace even the bpf prog has not changed anything.
(ignoring -EFAULT issue) this seems like it needs to be
if (optval && (ctx.optlen > max_optlen || ctx.optlen < 0)) {
/* error */
}
?
> Does it make sense to also bypass the bpf prog when 'ctx.optlen >
> max_optlen' for now (and this can use a separate patch which as usual
> requires a bpf selftests)?
Yeah, makes sense. Replacing this -EFAULT with WARN_ON_ONCE or something
seems like the way to go. It caused too much trouble already :-(
Should I prepare a patch or do you want to take a stab at it?
> In the future, does it make sense to have a specific cgroup-bpf-prog (a
> specific attach type?) that only uses bpf_dynptr kfunc to access the optval
> such that it can enforce read-only for some optname and potentially also
> track if bpf-prog has written a new optval? The bpf-prog can only return 1
> (OK) and only allows using bpf_set_retval() instead. Likely there is still
> holes but could be a seed of thought to continue polishing the idea.
Ack, let's think about it.
Maybe we should re-evaluate 'getsockopt-happens-after-the-kernel' idea
as well? If we can have a sleepable hook that can copy_from_user/copy_to_user,
and we have a mostly working bpf_getsockopt (after your refactoring),
I don't see why we need to continue the current scheme of triggering
after the kernel?
> > - or maybe we can even have a per-proto bpf_getsockopt_cleanup call that
> > gets called whenever bpf returns an error to make sure protocols have
> > a chance to handle that condition (and free the fd)
> >
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-18 16:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-13 13:33 [PATCH net-next v4 0/4] Add SCM_PIDFD and SO_PEERPIDFD Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-13 13:33 ` [PATCH net-next v4 1/4] scm: add SO_PASSPIDFD and SCM_PIDFD Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-17 15:18 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-17 16:01 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-17 17:16 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-17 17:43 ` Eric Dumazet
2023-04-18 8:16 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-18 13:07 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-13 13:33 ` [PATCH net-next v4 2/4] net: socket: add sockopts blacklist for BPF cgroup hook Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-13 14:21 ` Eric Dumazet
2023-04-13 14:38 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-13 16:37 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-15 1:55 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-17 14:42 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-17 18:10 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-18 1:03 ` handling unsupported optlen in cgroup bpf getsockopt: (was [PATCH net-next v4 2/4] net: socket: add sockopts blacklist for BPF cgroup hook) Martin KaFai Lau
2023-04-18 16:47 ` Stanislav Fomichev [this message]
2023-04-25 17:59 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2023-04-25 18:42 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-25 21:11 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2023-04-26 15:50 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-25 21:28 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2023-04-26 15:50 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-04-15 0:51 ` [PATCH net-next v4 2/4] net: socket: add sockopts blacklist for BPF cgroup hook Jakub Kicinski
2023-04-13 13:33 ` [PATCH net-next v4 3/4] net: core: add getsockopt SO_PEERPIDFD Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-04-18 13:13 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-13 13:33 ` [PATCH net-next v4 4/4] selftests: net: add SCM_PIDFD / SO_PEERPIDFD test Alexander Mikhalitsyn
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