From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Yi He <clangllvm@126.com>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com,
jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org,
davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, hawk@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add a sysctl option to disable bpf offensive helpers.
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 21:18:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZIackaLpA3APFFvj@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230610152618.105518-1-clangllvm@126.com>
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 03:26:18PM +0000, Yi He wrote:
> The default value of sysctl_offensive_bpf_disabled is 0, which means
> all the five helpers are enabled. By setting sysctl_offensive_bpf_disabled
> to 1, these helpers cannot be used util a reboot. By setting it to 2,
> these helpers cannot be used but privieleged users can modify this flag
> to 0.
That's just a nightmare API. The right thing is to not allow
program types that can use the helpers from anything but a global
fully privileged context.
And offensive is in this context a really weird term. Nothing is
offensive here, invasive or allowing to change kernel state might be
better terms.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-12 4:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-10 15:26 [PATCH] Add a sysctl option to disable bpf offensive helpers Yi He
2023-06-12 4:18 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2023-06-12 15:01 ` KP Singh
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-06-10 11:05 Yi He
2023-06-10 15:07 ` Stephen Hemminger
2023-06-10 15:37 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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