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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported()
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 09:39:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZMKd2cT2fw4ZiJQp@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230725091611.GA3766257@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Tue, Jul 25, 2023, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 02:40:03PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 24, 2023, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 01:18:54PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Check "this" CPU instead of the boot CPU when querying SVM support so that
> > > > the per-CPU checks done during hardware enabling actually function as
> > > > intended, i.e. will detect issues where SVM isn't support on all CPUs.
> > > 
> > > Is that a realistic concern?
> > 
> > It's not a concern in the sense that it should never happen, but I know of at
> > least one example where VMX on Intel completely disappeared[1].  The "compatibility"
> > checks are really more about the entire VMX/SVM feature set, the base VMX/SVM
> > support check is just an easy and obvious precursor to the full compatibility
> > checks.
> > 
> > Of course, SVM doesn't currently have compatibility checks on the full SVM feature
> > set, but that's more due to lack of a forcing function than a desire to _not_ have
> > them.  Intel CPUs have a pesky habit of bugs, ucode updates, and/or in-field errors
> > resulting in VMX features randomly appearing or disappearing.  E.g. there's an
> > ongoing buzilla (sorry) issue[2] where a user is only able to load KVM *after* a
> > suspend+resume cycle, because TSC scaling only shows up on one socket immediately
> > after boot, which is then somehow resolved by suspend+resume.
> > 
> > [1] 009bce1df0bb ("x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted")
> > [2] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217574
> 
> Is that using late loading of ucode?

Not sure, though I don't think that is relevant for this particular bug.

> Anything that changes *any* feature flag must be early ucode load, there is
> no other possible way since einux does feature enumeration early, and
> features are fixed thereafter.
> 
> This is one of the many reasons late loading is a trainwreck.
> 
> Doing suspend/resume probably re-loads the firmware

Ya, it does.

> and re-does the feature enumeration -- I didn't check.

The reported ucode revision is the same before and after resume, and is consistent
across all CPUs.  KVM does the per-CPU feature enumeration (for sanity checks)
everytime userspace attempts to load KVM (the module), so the timing of the ucode
patch load _shouldn't_ matter.

The user is running quite old ucode for their system, so the current theory is that
old buggy ucode is to blame.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-27 16:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-21 20:18 [PATCH v4 00/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] x86/reboot: Harden virtualization hooks for " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Handle VMXOFF in KVM's reboot callback Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 23:57   ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Disable SVM during reboot via virt/KVM " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 21:19   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-24 21:41     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] x86/reboot: Hoist "disable virt" helpers above "emergency reboot" path Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 23:57   ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_{INTEL,AMD} is enabled Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_vmx() in KVM VMX Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] x86/virt: KVM: Move VMXOFF helpers into " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-28  9:08   ` Xu Yilun
2023-07-28  9:43     ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: SVM: Make KVM_AMD depend on CPU_SUP_AMD or CPU_SUP_HYGON Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_svm() into kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 21:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-24 21:40     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25  9:16       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-27 16:39         ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-07-24 22:29   ` Dmitry Torokhov
2023-07-24 23:53     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: VMX: Ensure CPU is stable when probing basic VMX support Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] x86/virt: KVM: Move "disable SVM" helper into KVM SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: x86: Force kvm_rebooting=true during emergency reboot/crash Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: SVM: Use "standard" stgi() helper when disabling SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: VMX: Skip VMCLEAR logic during emergency reboots if CR4.VMXE=0 Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25  3:51   ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-25 18:15     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 22:20       ` Huang, Kai
2023-08-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson

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