From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/HVM: adjust hvm_interrupt_blocked()
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 12:57:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZPByJJEoJOjV3CIY@MacBook-MacBook-Pro-de-Roger.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZPBusqv7NGaJnOoT@MacBook-MacBook-Pro-de-Roger.local>
On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 12:42:58PM +0200, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:58:46AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > First of all, hvm_intsrc_mce was not considered here at all, yet nothing
> > blocks #MC (other than an already in-progress #MC, but dealing with this
> > is not the purpose of this patch).
> >
> > Additionally STI-shadow only blocks maskable interrupts, but not NMI.
>
> I've found the Table 25-3 on Intel SDM vol3 quite helpful:
>
> "Execution of STI with RFLAGS.IF = 0 blocks maskable interrupts on the
> instruction boundary following its execution.1 Setting this bit
> indicates that this blocking is in effect."
>
> And:
>
> "Execution of a MOV to SS or a POP to SS blocks or suppresses certain
> debug exceptions as well as interrupts (maskable and nonmaskable) on
> the instruction boundary following its execution."
>
> Might be worth adding to the commit message IMO.
So I've found a further footnote that contains:
"Nonmaskable interrupts and system-management interrupts may also be
inhibited on the instruction boundary following such an execution of
STI."
So we want to take the more restrictive implementation of STI-shadow,
and block #NMI there also.
Thanks, Roger.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-31 10:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-12 15:58 [PATCH] x86/HVM: adjust hvm_interrupt_blocked() Jan Beulich
2018-10-12 16:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-10-25 9:10 ` Jan Beulich
2018-10-25 11:30 ` Jan Beulich
2018-10-26 12:56 ` Jan Beulich
2023-08-31 10:42 ` [Xen-devel] " Roger Pau Monné
2023-08-31 10:57 ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2023-09-04 13:40 ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-05 10:36 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-09-04 13:55 ` Jan Beulich
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