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From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>,
	Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com>,
	Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 5/5] tls: don't decrypt the next record if it's of a different type
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 15:25:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZQG4SXGaJpCtWX_k@hog> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZP/rS+NtSbJ3EuWc@gondor.apana.org.au>

2023-09-12, 12:38:35 +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 08, 2023 at 05:38:49PM +0200, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> >
> > tls_decrypt_done only runs the completion when decrypt_pending drops
> > to 0, so this should be covered.
> 
> That doesn't look very safe.  What if the first decrypt completes
> before the second decrypt even starts? Wouldn't that cause two
> complete calls on ctx->async_wait?
> 
> > I wonder if this situation could happen:
> > 
> > tls_sw_recvmsg
> >   process first record
> >     decrypt_pending = 1
> >                                   CB runs
> >                                   decrypt_pending = 0
> >                                   complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
> > 
> >   process second record
> >     decrypt_pending = 1
> >   tls_sw_recvmsg reaches "recv_end"
> >     decrypt_pending != 0
> >     crypto_wait_req sees the first completion of ctx->async_wait and proceeds
> > 
> >                                   CB runs
> >                                   decrypt_pending = 0
> >                                   complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
> 
> Yes that's exactly what I was thinking of.
> 
> I think this whole thing needs some rethinking and rewriting.

I'm not sure there's a problem.

In tls_sw_recvmsg, the code waiting for async decrypts does:

	/* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
	reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
	pending = atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
	ret = 0;
	if (pending)
		ret = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);


And the async callback finishes with:

	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
	if (!atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending))
		complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);


Since we have the reinit_completion call, we'll ignore the previous
complete() (for the first record), and still wait for the 2nd record's
completion.

Does that still look unsafe to you?

-- 
Sabrina


  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-13 13:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-06 17:08 [PATCH net 0/5] tls: fix some issues with async encryption Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-06 17:08 ` [PATCH net 1/5] net: tls: handle -EBUSY on async encrypt/decrypt requests Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-07  1:50   ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-07 15:11   ` Simon Horman
2023-09-08  6:10   ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-08 15:55     ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-08 21:26       ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-09  0:53         ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-12  4:43       ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-12 15:37         ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-14  9:00           ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-06 17:08 ` [PATCH net 2/5] tls: fix use-after-free with partial reads and async decrypt Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-07  2:05   ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-07 13:56     ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-06 17:08 ` [PATCH net 3/5] tls: fix returned read length with async !zc decrypt Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-06 17:08 ` [PATCH net 4/5] tls: fix race condition in async decryption of corrupted records Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-06 17:08 ` [PATCH net 5/5] tls: don't decrypt the next record if it's of a different type Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-07  3:47   ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-07 12:21     ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-07 17:08       ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-08  6:06       ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-08 15:38         ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-09-12  4:38           ` Herbert Xu
2023-09-13 13:25             ` Sabrina Dubroca [this message]
2023-09-14  9:45               ` Herbert Xu

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