From: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
To: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: jpoimboe@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, leit@meta.com,
"open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)"
<bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 02:50:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZTeTXcTy1tsn/msq@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALOAHbDreP4JpL_C=+mkpwRvMpkVDdE-LNxkN=oyJW2vPjM_GQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hello Yafang,
On Mon, Oct 23, 2023 at 10:59:13AM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 2:12 AM Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:
> >
> > Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> > where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> > modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> > could not be controlled at build time.
> >
> > The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
> >
> > 1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
> > their workloads.
> >
> > 2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
> > the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
> >
> > 3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
> > so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
> > reason.
> >
> > Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
> > could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
>
> Hi Breno,
>
> Do you have any plans to introduce utility functions for runtime
> checks on whether specific mitigations are disabled? Such helpers
> would be quite valuable; for instance, we could utilize them to
> determine if Spectre v1 or Spectre v4 mitigations are disabled in
> BPF[1].
I am not planning to. The check if a mitigation is enabled or not is a
different topic, that also might require some further refactor.
This patch set focuses in the initialization of the mitigation code
at build time. Initializating the mitigation code might not result in
the mitigation being enabled in runtime.
For instance, you can build the kernel to mitigate the GDS, but the
runtime detects that you are running in a guest VM, and depend on the
host to do the mitigation, so, the mitigation might be enabled or not,
even if it is initialized with CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION=y.
Detecting if the mitigation is enabled or not is an orthogonal problem
than the one I am trying to solve with this patch set.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-24 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-19 18:11 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-25 16:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-26 17:09 ` Breno Leitao
2023-11-09 22:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-11-21 15:55 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-23 2:59 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Yafang Shao
2023-10-24 9:50 ` Breno Leitao [this message]
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