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From: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC bpf-next 4/3] uprobe: ensure sys_uretprobe uses sysret
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 10:59:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZfwFBgfdHUzQBdxS@krava> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240320152848.GA7613@redhat.com>

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:28:48PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:

SNIP

> 	SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
> 	{
> 		struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
> 		unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
> 
> 		err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user*)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
> 		WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
> 
> 		// Q1: apart from ax, do we really care?
> 		// expose the "right" values of r11/cx/ax/sp to uprobe_consumer's
> 		regs->r11 = r11_cx_ax[0];
> 		regs->cx  = r11_cx_ax[1];
> 		regs->ax  = r11_cx_ax[2];
> 		regs->sp += sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
> 		regs->orig_ax = -1;
> 
> 		ip = regs->ip;
> 		sp = regs->sp;
> 
> 		uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
> 
> 		// Q2: is it possible? do we care?
> 		// uprobe_consumer has changed sp, we can do nothing,
> 		// just return via iret.
> 		if (regs->sp != sp)
> 			return regs->ax;
> 		regs->sp -= sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
> 
> 		// Q3: is it possible? do we care?
> 		// for the case uprobe_consumer has changed r11/cx
> 		r11_cx_ax[0] = regs->r11;
> 		r11_cx_ax[1] = regs->cx;

I wonder we could add test for this as well, and check we return
proper register values in case the consuer changed them, will check

> 
> 		// comment to explain this hack
> 		r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
> 		regs->ip = ip;

we still need restore regs->ip in case do_syscall_64 decides to do
iret for some reason, right?

overall lgtm, thanks

jirka

> 
> 		err = copy_to_user((void __user*)regs->sp, r11_cx_ax, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
> 		WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
> 
> 		// ensure sysret, see do_syscall_64()
> 		regs->r11 = regs->flags;
> 		regs->cx  = regs->ip;
> 
> 		return regs->ax;
> 	}
> 
> Oleg.
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-21  9:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-18  9:31 [PATCH RFC bpf-next 0/3] uprobe: uretprobe speed up Jiri Olsa
2024-03-18  9:31 ` [PATCH RFC bpf-next 1/3] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe Jiri Olsa
2024-03-18 14:22   ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-19  1:11   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-19  6:32     ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-19 16:20       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-19 10:54     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-18  9:31 ` [PATCH RFC bpf-next 2/3] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19  1:16   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-19 11:09     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-18  9:31 ` [PATCH RFC bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: Mark uprobe trigger functions with nocf_check attribute Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19  1:22   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-19 11:11     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-22 13:40       ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19 10:25 ` [PATCH RFC bpf-next 4/3] uprobe: ensure sys_uretprobe uses sysret Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-19 11:08   ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19 16:25     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-19 16:38       ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-19 19:35       ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19 19:31     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-19 20:13       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-20 11:04       ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-20 14:37         ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-20 15:28           ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-20 17:44             ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-03-20 19:08               ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-21 10:10                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-21  9:59             ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2024-03-21 10:17               ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-21 10:52                 ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-21 12:14                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-03-21 20:29                     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-03-22  8:48                       ` Oleg Nesterov

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