All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	 michael.roth@amd.com, isaku.yamahata@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 15:24:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZimGulY6qyxt6ylO@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240423235013.GO3596705@ls.amr.corp.intel.com>

On Tue, Apr 23, 2024, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 02:50:31PM -0400,
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > During guest run-time, kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() is issued as needed to
> > prepare newly-allocated gmem pages prior to mapping them into the guest.
> > In the case of SEV-SNP, this mainly involves setting the pages to
> > private in the RMP table.
> > 
> > However, for the GPA ranges comprising the initial guest payload, which
> > are encrypted/measured prior to starting the guest, the gmem pages need
> > to be accessed prior to setting them to private in the RMP table so they
> > can be initialized with the userspace-provided data. Additionally, an
> > SNP firmware call is needed afterward to encrypt them in-place and
> > measure the contents into the guest's launch digest.
> > 
> > While it is possible to bypass the kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() hooks so that
> > this handling can be done in an open-coded/vendor-specific manner, this
> > may expose more gmem-internal state/dependencies to external callers
> > than necessary. Try to avoid this by implementing an interface that
> > tries to handle as much of the common functionality inside gmem as
> > possible, while also making it generic enough to potentially be
> > usable/extensible for TDX as well.
> 
> I explored how TDX will use this hook.  However, it resulted in not using this
> hook, and instead used kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk() with a twist.  The patch is below.
> 
> Because SEV-SNP manages the RMP that is not tied to NPT directly, SEV-SNP can
> ignore TDP MMU page tables when updating RMP.
> On the other hand, TDX essentially updates Secure-EPT when it adds a page to
> the guest by TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD().  It needs to protect KVM TDP MMU page tables
> with mmu_lock, not guest memfd file mapping with invalidate_lock.  The hook
> doesn't apply to TDX well.  The resulted KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION logic is as
> follows.
> 
>   get_user_pages_fast(source addr)
>   read_lock(mmu_lock)
>   kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk_private_pfn(vcpu, gpa, &pfn);
>   if the page table doesn't map gpa, error.
>   TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD()
>   TDH.MR.EXTEND()
>   read_unlock(mmu_lock)
>   put_page()

Hmm, KVM doesn't _need_ to use invalidate_lock to protect against guest_memfd
invalidation, but I also don't see why it would cause problems.  I.e. why not
take mmu_lock() in TDX's post_populate() implementation?  That would allow having
a sanity check that the PFN that guest_memfd() has is indeed the PFN that KVM's
S-EPT mirror has, i.e. the PFN that KVM is going to PAGE.ADD.

> >From 7d4024049b51969a2431805c2117992fc7ec0981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> Message-ID: <7d4024049b51969a2431805c2117992fc7ec0981.1713913379.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> In-Reply-To: <cover.1713913379.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> References: <cover.1713913379.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 11:33:44 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Add a helper function to walk down the TDP MMU
> 
> KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION needs to check if the given GFN is already
> populated.  Add wrapping logic to kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk() to export it.

> +int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk_private_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa,
> +				     kvm_pfn_t *pfn)
> +{
> +	u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1], spte;
> +	int leaf;
> +
> +	lockdep_assert_held(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
> +
> +	kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_begin();

This is obviously not a lockless walk.

> +	leaf = __kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, gpa, sptes, true);
> +	kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_end();
> +	if (leaf < 0)
> +		return -ENOENT;
> +
> +	spte = sptes[leaf];
> +	if (is_shadow_present_pte(spte) && is_last_spte(spte, leaf)) {
> +		*pfn = spte_to_pfn(spte);
> +		return leaf;
>  	}
>  
> -	return leaf;
> +	return -ENOENT;
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk_private_pfn);
>  
>  /*
>   * Returns the last level spte pointer of the shadow page walk for the given
> -- 
> 2.43.2
> 
> -- 
> Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-24 22:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-04 18:50 [PATCH 00/11] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 01/11] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-29 13:14   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 02/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-29 13:15   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 03/11] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 04/11] filemap: add FGP_CREAT_ONLY Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-25  5:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-29 13:26     ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 05/11] KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 06/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-22 10:53   ` Xu Yilun
2024-05-07 16:17     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 07/11] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-09 23:35   ` Michael Roth
2024-04-24 22:34   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-24 22:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 08/11] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_punch_hole() Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 09/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-22 14:44   ` Xu Yilun
2024-04-23 23:50   ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-24 22:24     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-04-25  1:12       ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-25  6:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-25 16:00           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-25 16:51             ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-26  5:44               ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-26 17:15                 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-26  5:41             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-26 15:17               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-07 23:03                 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-10 21:48                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-10 22:26                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-10 23:40                       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-11  6:09                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-24 22:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-25  5:56     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 10/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 11/11] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-09 23:46   ` Michael Roth
2024-04-19 18:26     ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-22 14:52   ` Xu Yilun

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZimGulY6qyxt6ylO@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.