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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"xin@zytor.com" <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:09:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZjC1QpnyQA0gHoo4@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240207172646.3981-16-xin3.li@intel.com>

On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 01:26:35AM +0800, Xin Li wrote:
>Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.
>
>Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
>---
>
>Change since v1:
>* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
>* Dump guest FRED states only if guest has FRED enabled (Nikolay Borisov).
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index a484b9ac2400..e3409607122d 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -6392,7 +6392,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>        struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>        u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
>        u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
>-       u64 tertiary_exec_control;
>+       u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
>        unsigned long cr4;
>        int efer_slot;
>
>@@ -6403,6 +6403,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
>        vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
>        vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
>+       secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
>+                              vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
>        cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>        pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>        cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
>@@ -6449,6 +6451,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>        vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
>        vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
>        vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+       if (kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu)) {

FRED MSRs are accessible even if CR4.FRED isn't set and #ifdef is ugly, I think
you can simply do:

	if (vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)

just like below handling for EFER/PAT etc.

>+               pr_err("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+                      "RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+                      "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+                      vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+                      vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+                      read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0),
>+                      vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+                      vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+                      vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+       }
>+#endif
>        efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
>        if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
>                pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
>@@ -6496,6 +6511,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>               vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
>        pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
>               vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+       if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {

ditto

>+               pr_err("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+                      "RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+                      "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+                      vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+                      vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+                      vmx->msr_host_fred_rsp0,
>+                      vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+                      vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+                      vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+       }
>+#endif
>        pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
>               vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
>               vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
>@@ -6517,25 +6545,29 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>        pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
>        pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
>               cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
>-       pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
>-              pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
>+       pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n",
>+              pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl);
>+       pr_err("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n",
>+              vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);
>        pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
>               vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
>               vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
>               vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
>-       pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
>+       pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event data=%016llx\n",

s/event data/event_data/

>               vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
>               vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
>-              vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
>+              vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN),
>+              kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA) : 0);

again, it is better to check some vmexit/vmentry ctrl bit.

>        pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
>               vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
>               vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
>               vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
>        pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
>               vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
>-       pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
>+       pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event data=%016llx\n",

s/event data/event_data/

>               vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
>-              vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
>+              vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE),
>+              kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA) : 0);

ditto

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-30  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-07 17:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:21   ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:22   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:12   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  3:27     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2024-04-19 11:02   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:19   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  3:31     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs Xin Li
2024-04-19 13:35   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:06     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-05 17:09       ` Xin Li
2024-09-12 20:05         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-18  8:35           ` Xin Li
2024-09-25 14:12             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-25 22:13               ` Xin Li
2024-09-27 17:48                 ` Xin Li
2024-09-30 16:56                   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 21:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:01   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:02     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:23   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 16:37     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 15:51     ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 15:12       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 16:15         ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 16:27           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 17:17             ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 19:30               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 17:31               ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 13:59                 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-18 17:44                   ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 21:04         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-07-19 15:59           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-21 18:09             ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2024-04-29  6:31   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2024-04-29  8:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-05-11  1:24     ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11  1:53       ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2024-04-30  3:14   ` Chao Gao
2024-05-10  9:36     ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11  3:03       ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:31         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  5:29           ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 22:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:57   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 18:02     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2024-04-30  7:34   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:01   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li
2024-04-30  8:21   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 18:00     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2024-04-30  9:09   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2024-06-12 23:55     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:31   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
2024-03-29 20:18   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-03-29 20:18     ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-03-29 20:18   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-24 16:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-27  8:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Kang, Shan
2024-06-13 18:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-14  0:52     ` Li, Xin3
2024-04-15 17:58 ` Li, Xin3

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