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From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	maz@kernel.org, will@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	james.morse@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	yuzenghui@huawei.com, wangzhou1@hisilicon.com,
	linuxarm@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Disable OS double lock visibility by default and ignore VMM writes
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 17:39:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZrUC5O8XUuvlLJcc@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240808125711.14368-1-shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>

Hi Shameer,

I find myself asking *why* we need this, could you share some details
on the issue you're encountering?

Indeed, RAZ/WI is not a faithful implementation of FEAT_DoubleLock, but
I wouldn't expect it to be used in a VM in the first place.

On Thu, Aug 08, 2024 at 01:57:11PM +0100, Shameer Kolothum wrote:
> KVM exposes the OS double lock feature bit to Guests but returns
> RAZ/WI on Guest OSDLR_EL1 access. Make sure we are hiding OS double
> lock from Guests now. However we can't hide DoubleLock if the reported
> DebugVer is < 8.2. So report a minimum DebugVer of 8.2 to Guests.

What if a user wanted to virtualize an exact CPU model that only
implemented v8.0?

> All this may break migration from the older kernels. Take care of
> that by ignoring VMM writes for these values.

Ignoring userspace writes is a pretty big hammer. In situations where
KVM had advertised a feature that was outright not supported (e.g. IMP DEF
PMUs) it _might_ make sense. But with this change we're messing with a
CPU feature we *do* support.

Would allowing userspace to downgrade ID_AA664DFR0_EL1.DoubleLock to
0b1111 be enough?

-- 
Thanks,
Oliver

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-08 17:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-08 12:57 [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Disable OS double lock visibility by default and ignore VMM writes Shameer Kolothum
2024-08-08 17:39 ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2024-08-08 18:10   ` Shameerali Kolothum Thodi
2024-08-08 18:31     ` Oliver Upton
2024-08-08 18:38       ` Shameerali Kolothum Thodi
2024-08-08 23:19         ` Oliver Upton

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