From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, david.kaplan@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed feature
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 12:16:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZvxKoz9WQKmOp5HR@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2e2e6161-9f65-4939-8061-83bf71810076@amd.com>
On Tue, Oct 01, 2024, Suravee Suthikulpanit wrote:
> Hi Sean,
>
> On 9/30/2024 11:04 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 30, 2024, Suravee Suthikulpanit wrote:
> > > On SNP-enabled system, VMRUN marks AVIC Backing Page as in-use while
> > > the guest is running for both secure and non-secure guest. This causes
> > > any attempts to modify the RMP entries for the backing page to result in
> > > FAIL_INUSE response. This is to ensure that the AVIC backing page is not
> > > maliciously assigned to an SNP guest while the unencrypted guest is active.
> > >
> > > Currently, an attempt to run AVIC guest would result in the following error:
> > >
> > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff3a442e549cc270
> > > #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
> > > #PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation
> > > PGD b6ee01067 P4D b6ee02067 PUD 10096d063 PMD 11c540063 PTE 80000001149cc163
> > > SEV-SNP: PFN 0x1149cc unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x114800 - 0x114a00]
> > > ...
> > This should be "fixed" by commit 75253db41a46 ("KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA
> > and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe"), no?
>
> The commit 75253db41a46 fixes another issue related to 2MB-aligned in-use
> page, where the CPU incorrectly treats the whole 2MB region as in-use and
> signal an RMP violation #PF.
>
> This enhancement is mainly to allow hypervisor to write to the AVIC backing
> page of non-secure guest on SNP-enabled system.
In that case, the changelog needs to be rewritten, because the changelog very
explicitly talks about modifying RMP entries, whereas IIUC, the issue is that
cross-CPU writes to a vCPU's vAPIC page, e.g. to inject an interrupt, will generate
unexpected #PFs in the host.
> Note: This change might need to be ported to stable 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11 tree
> as well.
At the very least, it needs a fixes, which I believe is:
Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
6.9 and 6.10 aren't LTS kernels, so backports to them aren't necessary.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-30 5:50 [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed feature Suravee Suthikulpanit
2024-09-30 16:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 8:59 ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2024-10-01 19:16 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-10-01 11:04 ` Joao Martins
2024-10-18 10:02 ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZvxKoz9WQKmOp5HR@google.com \
--to=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.