From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"andrew.cooper3@citrix.com" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/18] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization
Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 13:05:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a135f18eeab880f002c7748da3aff8ed0c8c63e3.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230512235026.808058-7-seanjc@google.com>
On Fri, 2023-05-12 at 16:50 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization in an
> emergency. KVM enables hardware via on_each_cpu(), i.e. could re-enable
> hardware if a pending IPI were delivered after disabling virtualization.
>
> Remove a misleading comment from emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization()
> about "just" needing to guarantee the CPU is stable (see above).
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index 20f7bdabc52e..fddfea5f1d20 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -531,7 +531,6 @@ static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void);
>
> static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
> {
> - /* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */
> local_irq_disable();
>
> /*
> @@ -820,6 +819,13 @@ void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
> {
> cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback;
>
> + /*
> + * IRQs must be disabled as KVM enables virtualization in hardware via
> + * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
> + * virtualization stays disabled.
> + */
> + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> +
> rcu_read_lock();
> callback = rcu_dereference(cpu_emergency_virt_callback);
> if (callback)
> --
> 2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-22 13:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-12 23:50 [PATCH v3 00/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] x86/reboot: Harden virtualization hooks for " Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 12:46 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Handle VMXOFF in KVM's reboot callback Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 12:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-22 17:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:11 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Disable SVM during reboot via virt/KVM " Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 12:56 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:04 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-22 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:13 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:05 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] x86/reboot: Hoist "disable virt" helpers above "emergency reboot" path Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:11 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_{INTEL,AMD} is enabled Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:11 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_vmx() in KVM VMX Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:41 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move VMXOFF helpers into " Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:15 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: SVM: Make KVM_AMD depend on CPU_SUP_AMD or CPU_SUP_HYGON Sean Christopherson
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm() Sean Christopherson
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_svm() into kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:44 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:18 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: VMX: Ensure CPU is stable when probing basic VMX support Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:30 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move "disable SVM" helper into KVM SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:26 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: x86: Force kvm_rebooting=true during emergency reboot/crash Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:25 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-23 2:02 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-12 23:50 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: SVM: Use "standard" stgi() helper when disabling SVM Sean Christopherson
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