From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1fBkIY-0001LN-1p for speck@linutronix.de; Thu, 26 Apr 2018 19:03:12 +0200 Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v2] Linux Patch 1/1 References: <92c45587-5eb3-2421-6fc1-42e74a715e30@linux.intel.com> <3214c9b8-48d5-d939-5a67-df5f4f4f15a8@redhat.com> From: Tim Chen Message-ID: Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:03:01 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <3214c9b8-48d5-d939-5a67-df5f4f4f15a8@redhat.com> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="pBDDDZGacMIuOlf0e1eocAbl1ztp5Yv0H"; protected-headers="v1" To: speck@linutronix.de List-ID: This is an OpenPGP/MIME encrypted message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --pBDDDZGacMIuOlf0e1eocAbl1ztp5Yv0H Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="M3SVk9Myl2Rdy1TcsyuqDDtgCqJgwQZyT" --M3SVk9Myl2Rdy1TcsyuqDDtgCqJgwQZyT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 04/25/2018 08:15 PM, speck for Jon Masters wrote: > On 04/25/2018 08:11 PM, speck for Tim Chen wrote: >=20 >> Processes that are unable to use other software mitigations and execut= e >> untrusted code may want to disable speculative store bypass. This patc= h >> adds a new prctl : PR_SET_RDS_MODE. >=20 > Let's not use the Intel name for this. It should be neutral since it > will be used across architectures. PR_SET_SSB_MODE could be ok. >=20 > I personally favor a PR_SET_SPECULATION or similar first argument > (seeking input from Linus here) that could be used to set flags for thi= s > and any future additional limitations that might need to be added. I > can't see how this will be the first and only time. Another way around > could be PR_SET_VULNERABILITY but "speculation" seems nicer to me. >=20 How about PR_SET_SPECULATION_RESTRICTION? Linus, any suggestion? Tim --M3SVk9Myl2Rdy1TcsyuqDDtgCqJgwQZyT-- --pBDDDZGacMIuOlf0e1eocAbl1ztp5Yv0H--