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From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com>
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Stack buffer overflow (write) in kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd via malicious USB
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 09:44:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a38ccefc-6233-4be4-bbae-0ae0d4f4499b@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026021847-acclaim-coil-fe7a@gregkh>



On 18.02.26 06:12, Greg KH wrote:

> And is this the only place in this driver where it treats data in an
> untrusted way?  As you know, once a driver is bound to a device, we
> trust the hardware to work properly, so this really is just a "let's be
> careful" type of fix, not any real bug to be handled as a real device
> will not trigger this.

Do we know this? I am afraid we need to make up our minds.
We are including patches that verify endpoints are present,
are of the correct type and so on.

What is the logic behind that? If we can trust that a device
is what it claims to be and operates like it is supposed to
be, why do we verify?

	Regards
		Oliver


  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-24  8:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-18  2:13 Stack buffer overflow (write) in kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd via malicious USB Nicholas Carlini
2026-02-18  5:12 ` Greg KH
2026-02-24  8:44   ` Oliver Neukum [this message]
2026-02-24 15:52     ` Alan Stern
2026-02-24 16:04       ` Oliver Neukum
2026-02-24 18:43         ` Alan Stern
2026-02-27  4:29           ` Greg KH
2026-02-28  2:22             ` Alan Stern
2026-10-21 16:53             ` Linux USB threat-model document Alan Stern
2026-10-21 18:26               ` Greg KH
2026-10-22 17:53                 ` Alan Stern

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