From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"consulting @ bugseng . com" <consulting@bugseng.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86: Address MIRSA R8.3 (declaration/definition mismatch) issues
Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2025 07:58:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a965c6d701243f840ad67e7916118450@bugseng.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251212222032.2640580-4-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
s/MIRSA/MISRA/ in the subject, here and in patch 4
On 2025-12-12 23:20, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> These are mostly name mismatches, but a couple have type alias
> mismatches too.
>
> For shadow_put_top_level() and is_patch(), the declaration name is the
> better
> choice so change the name in the function.
>
> No functional change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> ---
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> CC: consulting@bugseng.com <consulting@bugseng.com>
> CC: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hypercall.h | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/include/asm/pv/mm.h | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/include/asm/shadow.h | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 8 ++++----
> xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.h | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h | 10 +++++-----
> xen/common/kimage.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/livepatch.c | 14 +++++++-------
> xen/include/xen/livepatch.h | 2 +-
> 10 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hypercall.h
> b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hypercall.h
> index f6e9e2313b3c..bf2f0e169aef 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hypercall.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hypercall.h
> @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
> void pv_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
> #endif
>
> -void pv_ring1_init_hypercall_page(void *ptr);
> -void pv_ring3_init_hypercall_page(void *ptr);
> +void pv_ring1_init_hypercall_page(void *p);
> +void pv_ring3_init_hypercall_page(void *p);
>
> /*
> * Both do_mmuext_op() and do_mmu_update():
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/pv/mm.h
> b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/pv/mm.h
> index 182764542c1f..a5745908206a 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/pv/mm.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/pv/mm.h
> @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int pv_set_gdt(struct vcpu *v, const unsigned long
> frames[],
> unsigned int entries);
> void pv_destroy_gdt(struct vcpu *v);
>
> -bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int off);
> +bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int offset);
> bool pv_destroy_ldt(struct vcpu *v);
>
> int validate_segdesc_page(struct page_info *page);
> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static inline int pv_set_gdt(struct vcpu *v, const
> unsigned long frames[],
> { ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); return -EINVAL; }
> static inline void pv_destroy_gdt(struct vcpu *v) {
> ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); }
>
> -static inline bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int off) { return
> false; }
> +static inline bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int offset) {
> return false; }
> static inline bool pv_destroy_ldt(struct vcpu *v)
> { ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); return false; }
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/shadow.h
> b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/shadow.h
> index 9a8d1b8353cd..60589c3cacee 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/shadow.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/shadow.h
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32 mode);
>
> /* Enable VRAM dirty bit tracking. */
> int shadow_track_dirty_vram(struct domain *d,
> - unsigned long first_pfn,
> + unsigned long begin_pfn,
> unsigned int nr_frames,
> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void)
> guest_dirty_bitmap);
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> index b929d15d0050..0d0d5292953b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> @@ -4566,7 +4566,7 @@ static int __do_update_va_mapping(
> }
>
> long do_update_va_mapping(
> - unsigned long va, u64 val64, unsigned long flags)
> + unsigned long va, uint64_t val64, unsigned long flags)
> {
> int rc = __do_update_va_mapping(va, val64, flags,
> current->domain);
>
> @@ -4578,7 +4578,7 @@ long do_update_va_mapping(
> }
>
> long do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(
> - unsigned long va, u64 val64, unsigned long flags, domid_t domid)
> + unsigned long va, uint64_t val64, unsigned long flags, domid_t
> domid)
> {
> struct domain *pg_owner;
> int rc;
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> index f2aee5be46a7..f9310d008de6 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn,
> unsigned int type)
> TRACE_SHADOW_PATH_FLAG(TRCE_SFLAG_PROMOTE);
> }
>
> -void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type)
> +void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, unsigned int type)
> {
> struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(gmfn);
>
> @@ -2615,11 +2615,11 @@ pagetable_t sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu
> *v,
> * Helper invoked when releasing of a top-level shadow's reference was
> * deferred in sh_set_toplevel_shadow() above.
> */
> -void shadow_put_top_level(struct domain *d, pagetable_t old_entry)
> +void shadow_put_top_level(struct domain *d, pagetable_t old)
> {
> - ASSERT(!pagetable_is_null(old_entry));
> + ASSERT(!pagetable_is_null(old));
> paging_lock(d);
> - sh_put_ref(d, pagetable_get_mfn(old_entry), 0);
> + sh_put_ref(d, pagetable_get_mfn(old), 0);
> paging_unlock(d);
> }
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.h
> b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.h
> index 0e938594345a..fc86d7a8d9cd 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.h
> @@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ SHADOW_INTERNAL_NAME(sh_paging_mode, GUEST_LEVELS);
> #if SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC
> extern void
> SHADOW_INTERNAL_NAME(sh_resync_l1, GUEST_LEVELS)
> - (struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmfn, mfn_t snpmfn);
> + (struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gl1mfn, mfn_t snpmfn);
>
> extern int
> SHADOW_INTERNAL_NAME(sh_safe_not_to_sync, GUEST_LEVELS)
> - (struct vcpu*v, mfn_t gmfn);
> + (struct vcpu*v, mfn_t gl1mfn);
>
> extern int
> SHADOW_INTERNAL_NAME(sh_rm_write_access_from_sl1p, GUEST_LEVELS)
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
> b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
> index bc99e00100f7..12cfb52f095b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
> @@ -364,11 +364,11 @@ bool shadow_hash_delete(struct domain *d,
> unsigned long n, unsigned int t, mfn_t smfn);
>
> /* shadow promotion */
> -void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type);
> -void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type);
> +void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, unsigned int type);
> +void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, unsigned int type);
>
> /* Shadow page allocation functions */
> -bool __must_check shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int
> shadow_type,
> +bool __must_check shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type,
> unsigned int count);
> mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d,
> u32 shadow_type,
> @@ -392,11 +392,11 @@ int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t
> gmfn, void *entry, u32 size);
> * Returns non-zero if we need to flush TLBs.
> * level and fault_addr desribe how we found this to be a pagetable;
> * level==0 means we have some other reason for revoking write access.
> */
> -extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t
> readonly_mfn,
> +extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn,
> unsigned int level,
> unsigned long fault_addr);
> #else
> -static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t
> readonly_mfn,
> +static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn,
> unsigned int level,
> unsigned long fault_addr)
> {
> diff --git a/xen/common/kimage.c b/xen/common/kimage.c
> index 9961eac187e9..e1aec5a18a54 100644
> --- a/xen/common/kimage.c
> +++ b/xen/common/kimage.c
> @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
> static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kexec_image *image,
> paddr_t start, paddr_t end);
> static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_page(struct kexec_image *image,
> - paddr_t dest);
> + paddr_t destination);
>
> static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_zeroed_page(unsigned memflags)
> {
> diff --git a/xen/common/livepatch.c b/xen/common/livepatch.c
> index d0da2aa28132..7446533c8cfb 100644
> --- a/xen/common/livepatch.c
> +++ b/xen/common/livepatch.c
> @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int verify_payload(const struct
> xen_sysctl_livepatch_upload *upload, char
> return 0;
> }
>
> -bool is_patch(const void *ptr)
> +bool is_patch(const void *addr)
> {
> const struct payload *data;
> bool r = false;
> @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ bool is_patch(const void *ptr)
> rcu_read_lock(&rcu_payload_lock);
> list_for_each_entry_rcu ( data, &payload_list, list )
> {
> - if ( (ptr >= data->rw_addr &&
> - ptr < (data->rw_addr + data->rw_size)) ||
> - (ptr >= data->ro_addr &&
> - ptr < (data->ro_addr + data->ro_size)) ||
> - (ptr >= data->text_addr &&
> - ptr < (data->text_addr + data->text_size)) )
> + if ( (addr >= data->rw_addr &&
> + addr < (data->rw_addr + data->rw_size)) ||
> + (addr >= data->ro_addr &&
> + addr < (data->ro_addr + data->ro_size)) ||
> + (addr >= data->text_addr &&
> + addr < (data->text_addr + data->text_size)) )
> {
> r = 1;
> break;
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/livepatch.h b/xen/include/xen/livepatch.h
> index 3f5ad01f1bdd..45c8924f3412 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/livepatch.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/livepatch.h
> @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ enum va_type {
> * Function to secure the allocate pages (from
> arch_livepatch_alloc_payload)
> * with the right page permissions.
> */
> -int arch_livepatch_secure(const void *va, unsigned int pages, enum
> va_type types);
> +int arch_livepatch_secure(const void *va, unsigned int pages, enum
> va_type type);
>
> void arch_livepatch_init(void);
--
Nicola Vetrini, B.Sc.
Software Engineer
BUGSENG (https://bugseng.com)
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicola-vetrini-a42471253
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-13 6:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-12 22:20 [PATCH 0/5] x86: More misc MISRA fixes Andrew Cooper
2025-12-12 22:20 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/pv: Address MISRA C:2012 Rule 4.1 Andrew Cooper
2025-12-13 6:52 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-12-12 22:20 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/pv: Change type of do_update_descriptor()'s desc parameter Andrew Cooper
2025-12-12 22:20 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86: Address MIRSA R8.3 (declaration/definition mismatch) issues Andrew Cooper
2025-12-13 6:58 ` Nicola Vetrini [this message]
2025-12-12 22:20 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86: Address MIRSA R8.4 (declaration visibility) issues Andrew Cooper
2025-12-12 22:20 ` [PATCH RFC 5/5] x86/shadow: Deviate multi.h as being included multiple times Andrew Cooper
2025-12-13 7:04 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-12-15 10:15 ` [PATCH 0/5] x86: More misc MISRA fixes Jan Beulich
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=a965c6d701243f840ad67e7916118450@bugseng.com \
--to=nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com \
--cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=consulting@bugseng.com \
--cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
--cc=sstabellini@kernel.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.