All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: SSE related security hole
Date: 18 Apr 2002 14:06:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a9ncgs$2s2$1@cesium.transmeta.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20020418183639.20946.qmail@science.horizon.com>

Followup to:  <20020418183639.20946.qmail@science.horizon.com>
By author:    linux@horizon.com
In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel
>
> Um, people here seem to be assuming that, in the absence of MMX,
> fninit *doesn't* leak information.
> 
> I thought it was well-known to just clear (set to all-ones) the
> tag register and not alter the actual floating-point registers.
> 
> Thus, it seems quite feasible to reset the tag word with FLDENV and
> store out the FPU registers, even on an 80387.
> 
> Isn't this the same security hole?  Shouldn't there be 8 FLDZ instructions
> (or equivalent) in the processor state initialization?
> 

Perhaps the right thing to do is to have a description in data of the
desired initialization state and just F[NX]RSTOR it?

	-hpa
-- 
<hpa@transmeta.com> at work, <hpa@zytor.com> in private!
"Unix gives you enough rope to shoot yourself in the foot."
http://www.zytor.com/~hpa/puzzle.txt	<amsp@zytor.com>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2002-04-18 21:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2002-04-18 18:36 SSE related security hole linux
2002-04-18 18:53 ` Richard B. Johnson
2002-04-21 19:52   ` Pavel Machek
2002-04-21 22:11   ` David Wagner
2002-04-18 21:06 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2002-04-22 22:24 Saxena, Sunil
     [not found] <20020418183639.20946.qmail@science.horizon.com.suse.lists.linux.kernel>
     [not found] ` <a9ncgs$2s2$1@cesium.transmeta.com.suse.lists.linux.kernel>
2002-04-19 14:06   ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-19 18:00     ` Doug Ledford
2002-04-19 21:04       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2002-04-19 21:35         ` H. Peter Anvin
2002-04-19 21:42           ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-20  3:23             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2002-04-19 22:18         ` Jan Hubicka
     [not found] <200204182320.53095.nahshon@actcom.co.il>
2002-04-19 11:22 ` Alan Cox
2002-04-17 23:42 Doug Ledford
2002-04-18  5:26 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2002-04-18  9:10   ` Arjan van de Ven
2002-04-18 11:18   ` Alan Cox
2002-04-18 11:14     ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-18 11:53       ` Alan Cox
2002-04-18 11:46         ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-18 11:55         ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-18 13:44   ` Doug Ledford
2002-04-18 19:20     ` Pavel Machek
2002-04-18 19:32       ` Doug Ledford
2002-04-21 19:54         ` Pavel Machek
2002-04-18  8:22 ` Andi Kleen
2002-04-17 14:51 Jan Hubicka
2002-04-17 15:23 ` Jan Hubicka
2002-04-18 14:57   ` Denis Vlasenko

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='a9ncgs$2s2$1@cesium.transmeta.com' \
    --to=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.