All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2025-22029: exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2025 12:39:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aBH93qMAhgMEGDAY@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025041655-CVE-2025-22029-349f@gregkh>

Based on a follow up update from Oleg[1] I would like to dispute this
CVE.

TL;DR version
: with or without this patch the "if (fs->in_exec)" check in copy_fs()
: can obviously hit the 1 -> 0 transition.
: 
: This is harmless, but should be probably fixed just to avoid another report
: from KCSAN.

On Wed 16-04-25 16:12:00, Greg KH wrote:
> Description
> ===========
> 
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> 
> exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
> 
> check_unsafe_exec() sets fs->in_exec under cred_guard_mutex, then execve()
> paths clear fs->in_exec lockless. This is fine if exec succeeds, but if it
> fails we have the following race:
> 
> 	T1 sets fs->in_exec = 1, fails, drops cred_guard_mutex
> 
> 	T2 sets fs->in_exec = 1
> 
> 	T1 clears fs->in_exec
> 
> 	T2 continues with fs->in_exec == 0
> 
> Change fs/exec.c to clear fs->in_exec with cred_guard_mutex held.
> 
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-22029 to this issue.
> 
> 
> Affected and fixed versions
> ===========================
> 
> 	Fixed in 6.6.87 with commit 753a620a7f8e134b444f89fe90873234e894e21a
> 	Fixed in 6.12.23 with commit e2d8e7bd3314485e0b3b08380c659b3d1d67ed6a
> 	Fixed in 6.13.11 with commit a6b5070721503fb6021ebed51c925ffc66b1c5ab
> 	Fixed in 6.14.2 with commit b519f2e5800fe2391b7545ba6889df795828e885
> 	Fixed in 6.15-rc1 with commit af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0
> 
> Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
> kernel versions by the kernel community.
> 
> Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
> older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
> 	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-22029
> will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
> up to date information about this issue.
> 
> 
> Affected files
> ==============
> 
> The file(s) affected by this issue are:
> 	fs/exec.c
> 
> 
> Mitigation
> ==========
> 
> The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
> stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
> changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
> release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
> supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
> the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
> issue can be found at these commits:
> 	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/753a620a7f8e134b444f89fe90873234e894e21a
> 	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d8e7bd3314485e0b3b08380c659b3d1d67ed6a
> 	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6b5070721503fb6021ebed51c925ffc66b1c5ab
> 	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b519f2e5800fe2391b7545ba6889df795828e885
> 	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0

-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

  reply	other threads:[~2025-04-30 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-16 14:12 CVE-2025-22029: exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-04-30 10:39 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2025-04-30 10:57   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-04-30 11:20   ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-05-01 14:17     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=aBH93qMAhgMEGDAY@tiehlicka \
    --to=mhocko@suse.com \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.