From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3FA68C83F09 for ; Tue, 8 Jul 2025 19:42:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1uZED0-0000Pt-Ii; Tue, 08 Jul 2025 15:42:31 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1uZBOU-0008HM-Ts for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 08 Jul 2025 12:42:41 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1uZBLn-0004TU-0J for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 08 Jul 2025 12:41:31 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1751992629; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=llfg70zwZvemKREO+Y3xvA/utKhwZhzTm3ME815tZgY=; b=A/3dJyt96kKdzO2FnfarhMCO1BuCtwRU+AvNXBaYJrNgsUWE5DEYpKxVYbx8kH9R8Dix1A 0plT8Lia6FX3XLiU+/KTrRtw761v974GNJQ6aEttO8Qv0iEkbcMR9ep2XSVqgJ9OnQAZw3 w9RUDwbO7K2Qaj0+YlcyPEJawVqizSk= Received: from mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-35-165-154-97.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [35.165.154.97]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-638-WQXw6uIOPhO_3CffQGuvkQ-1; Tue, 08 Jul 2025 11:25:27 -0400 X-MC-Unique: WQXw6uIOPhO_3CffQGuvkQ-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: WQXw6uIOPhO_3CffQGuvkQ_1751988326 Received: from mx-prod-int-06.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-06.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.93]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9E4431809C9A; Tue, 8 Jul 2025 15:25:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (unknown [10.42.28.99]) by mx-prod-int-06.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 885D9180035C; Tue, 8 Jul 2025 15:25:18 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2025 16:25:15 +0100 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: Roy Hopkins Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Stefano Garzarella , Marcelo Tosatti , "Michael S . Tsirkin" , Cornelia Huck , Marcel Apfelbaum , Sergio Lopez , Eduardo Habkost , Alistair Francis , Peter Xu , David Hildenbrand , Igor Mammedov , Tom Lendacky , Michael Roth , Ani Sinha , Gerd Hoffman , Pankaj Gupta , Joerg Roedel Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/2.2.14 (2025-02-20) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.30.177.93 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 04:31:59PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote: > When an SEV guest is started, the reset vector and state are > extracted from metadata that is contained in the firmware volume. > > In preparation for using IGVM to setup the initial CPU state, > the code has been refactored to populate vmcb_save_area for each > CPU which is then applied during guest startup and CPU reset. > > Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins > Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin > Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella > Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman > Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta > --- > target/i386/sev.c | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > target/i386/sev.h | 110 ++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index a84f5f5d28..a13f91e615 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > +static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu) > +{ > + SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs); > + X86CPU *x86; > + CPUX86State *env; > + struct SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa; > + > + /* See if an initial VMSA has been provided for this CPU */ > + QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next) > + { > + if (cpu->cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) { > + x86 = X86_CPU(cpu); > + env = &x86->env; > + > + /* > + * Ideally we would provide the VMSA directly to kvm which would > + * ensure that the resulting initial VMSA measurement which is > + * calculated during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is calculated from > + * exactly what we provide here. Currently this is not possible so > + * we need to copy the parts of the VMSA structure that we currently > + * support into the CPU state. > + */ Are there any parts of the VMSA described in the IGVM that we are unable to handle here ? If so, what happens if those parts are set in the IGVM and their value doesn't match KVM's default ? Presumably that would become a measurement failure ? > + cpu_load_efer(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.efer); > + cpu_x86_update_cr4(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr4); > + cpu_x86_update_cr0(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr0); > + cpu_x86_update_cr3(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr3); > + env->xcr0 = launch_vmsa->vmsa.xcr0; > + env->pat = launch_vmsa->vmsa.g_pat; > + > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_CS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_DS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_ES, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_FS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_GS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_SS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.attrib)); > + > + env->gdt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.base; > + env->gdt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.limit; > + env->gdt.flags = > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.attrib); > + env->idt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.base; > + env->idt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.limit; > + env->idt.flags = > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.attrib); > + > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_LDTR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.attrib)); > + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache( > + env, R_TR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.selector, > + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.limit, > + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.attrib)); > + > + env->dr[6] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr6; > + env->dr[7] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr7; > + > + env->regs[R_EAX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rax; > + env->regs[R_ECX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rcx; > + env->regs[R_EDX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdx; > + env->regs[R_EBX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbx; > + env->regs[R_ESP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsp; > + env->regs[R_EBP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbp; > + env->regs[R_ESI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsi; > + env->regs[R_EDI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdi; > +#ifdef TARGET_X86_64 > + env->regs[R_R8] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r8; > + env->regs[R_R9] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r9; > + env->regs[R_R10] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r10; > + env->regs[R_R11] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r11; > + env->regs[R_R12] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r12; > + env->regs[R_R13] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r13; > + env->regs[R_R14] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r14; > + env->regs[R_R15] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r15; > +#endif > + env->eip = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rip; > + env->eflags = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rflags; > + > + cpu_set_fpuc(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.x87_fcw); > + env->mxcsr = launch_vmsa->vmsa.mxcsr; > + > + break; > + } > + } > +} > + > +static int sev_set_cpu_context(uint16_t cpu_index, const void *ctx, > + uint32_t ctx_len, hwaddr gpa, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs); > + SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa; > + CPUState *cpu; > + bool exists = false; > + > + /* > + * Setting the CPU context is only supported for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP. The > + * context buffer will contain a sev_es_save_area from the Linux kernel > + * which is defined by "Table B-4. VMSA Layout, State Save Area for SEV-ES" > + * in the AMD64 APM, Volume 2. > + */ > + > + if (!sev_es_enabled()) { > + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: Not supported"); > + return -1; > + } > + > + if (ctx_len < sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area)) { > + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: " > + "Invalid context provided"); > + return -1; > + } > + > + cpu = qemu_get_cpu(cpu_index); > + if (!cpu) { > + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context for out of bounds " > + "CPU index %d", cpu_index); > + return -1; > + } > + > + /* > + * If the context of this VP has already been set then replace it with the > + * new context. > + */ > + QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next) > + { > + if (cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) { > + launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa; > + memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa)); > + exists = true; > + break; > + } > + } > + > + if (!exists) { > + /* New VP context */ > + launch_vmsa = g_new0(SevLaunchVmsa, 1); > + memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa)); > + launch_vmsa->cpu_index = cpu_index; > + launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa; > + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sev_common->launch_vmsa, launch_vmsa, next); > + } > + > + /* Synchronise the VMSA with the current CPU state */ > + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > bool > sev_enabled(void) > { > @@ -998,6 +1176,16 @@ static int > sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev_guest) > { > int ret, fw_error; > + CPUState *cpu; > + > + /* > + * The initial CPU state is measured as part of KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA. > + * Synchronise the CPU state to any provided launch VMSA structures. > + */ > + CPU_FOREACH(cpu) { > + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu); > + } > + > > ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_guest)->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, > NULL, &fw_error); > @@ -1780,40 +1968,109 @@ sev_es_find_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size, > return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr); > } > > -void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu) > + > +static void seg_to_vmsa(const SegmentCache *cpu_seg, struct vmcb_seg *vmsa_seg) > { > - X86CPU *x86; > - CPUX86State *env; > - ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs; > - SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON( > - object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_COMMON)); > + vmsa_seg->selector = cpu_seg->selector; > + vmsa_seg->base = cpu_seg->base; > + vmsa_seg->limit = cpu_seg->limit; > + vmsa_seg->attrib = FLAGS_SEGCACHE_TO_VMSA(cpu_seg->flags); > +} > > - /* Only update if we have valid reset information */ > - if (!sev_common || !sev_common->reset_data_valid) { > - return; > - } > +static void initialize_vmsa(const CPUState *cpu, struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa) > +{ > + const X86CPU *x86 = X86_CPU(cpu); > + const CPUX86State *env = &x86->env; > > - /* Do not update the BSP reset state */ > - if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) { > - return; > + /* > + * Initialize the SEV-ES save area from the current state of > + * the CPU. The entire state does not need to be copied, only the state > + * that is copied back to the CPUState in sev_apply_cpu_context. > + */ > + memset(vmsa, 0, sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area)); > + vmsa->efer = env->efer; > + vmsa->cr0 = env->cr[0]; > + vmsa->cr3 = env->cr[3]; > + vmsa->cr4 = env->cr[4]; > + vmsa->xcr0 = env->xcr0; > + vmsa->g_pat = env->pat; > + > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_CS], &vmsa->cs); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_DS], &vmsa->ds); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_ES], &vmsa->es); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_FS], &vmsa->fs); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_GS], &vmsa->gs); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_SS], &vmsa->ss); > + > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->gdt, &vmsa->gdtr); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->idt, &vmsa->idtr); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->ldt, &vmsa->ldtr); > + seg_to_vmsa(&env->tr, &vmsa->tr); > + > + vmsa->dr6 = env->dr[6]; > + vmsa->dr7 = env->dr[7]; > + > + vmsa->rax = env->regs[R_EAX]; > + vmsa->rcx = env->regs[R_ECX]; > + vmsa->rdx = env->regs[R_EDX]; > + vmsa->rbx = env->regs[R_EBX]; > + vmsa->rsp = env->regs[R_ESP]; > + vmsa->rbp = env->regs[R_EBP]; > + vmsa->rsi = env->regs[R_ESI]; > + vmsa->rdi = env->regs[R_EDI]; > + > +#ifdef TARGET_X86_64 > + vmsa->r8 = env->regs[R_R8]; > + vmsa->r9 = env->regs[R_R9]; > + vmsa->r10 = env->regs[R_R10]; > + vmsa->r11 = env->regs[R_R11]; > + vmsa->r12 = env->regs[R_R12]; > + vmsa->r13 = env->regs[R_R13]; > + vmsa->r14 = env->regs[R_R14]; > + vmsa->r15 = env->regs[R_R15]; > +#endif > + > + vmsa->rip = env->eip; > + vmsa->rflags = env->eflags; > +} > + > +static void sev_es_set_ap_context(uint32_t reset_addr) > +{ > + CPUState *cpu; > + struct sev_es_save_area vmsa; > + SegmentCache cs; > + > + cs.selector = 0xf000; > + cs.base = reset_addr & 0xffff0000; > + cs.limit = 0xffff; > + cs.flags = DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK | DESC_R_MASK | > + DESC_A_MASK; > + > + CPU_FOREACH(cpu) { > + if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) { > + /* Do not update the BSP reset state */ > + continue; > + } > + initialize_vmsa(cpu, &vmsa); > + seg_to_vmsa(&cs, &vmsa.cs); > + vmsa.rip = reset_addr & 0x0000ffff; > + sev_set_cpu_context(cpu->cpu_index, &vmsa, > + sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area), > + 0, &error_fatal); > } > +} > > - x86 = X86_CPU(cpu); > - env = &x86->env; > - > - cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, sev_common->reset_cs, 0xffff, > - DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK | > - DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK); > - > - env->eip = sev_common->reset_ip; > +void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu) > +{ > + if (sev_enabled()) { > + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu); > + } > } > > int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size) > { > - CPUState *cpu; > uint32_t addr; > int ret; > - SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs); > > if (!sev_es_enabled()) { > return 0; > @@ -1826,14 +2083,12 @@ int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size) > return ret; > } > > + /* > + * The reset vector is saved into a CPU context for each AP but not for > + * the BSP. This is applied during guest startup or when the CPU is reset. > + */ > if (addr) { > - sev_common->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000; > - sev_common->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff; > - sev_common->reset_data_valid = true; > - > - CPU_FOREACH(cpu) { > - sev_es_set_reset_vector(cpu); > - } > + sev_es_set_ap_context(addr); > } > > return 0; > @@ -2068,6 +2323,7 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj) > object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "reduced-phys-bits", > &sev_common->reduced_phys_bits, > OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE); > + QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa); > } > > /* sev guest info common to sev/sev-es/sev-snp */ > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h > index 373669eaac..38caa849f5 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.h > +++ b/target/i386/sev.h > @@ -55,6 +55,116 @@ typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext { > size_t cmdline_size; > } SevKernelLoaderContext; > > +/* Save area definition for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests */ > +struct QEMU_PACKED sev_es_save_area { > + struct vmcb_seg es; > + struct vmcb_seg cs; > + struct vmcb_seg ss; > + struct vmcb_seg ds; > + struct vmcb_seg fs; > + struct vmcb_seg gs; > + struct vmcb_seg gdtr; > + struct vmcb_seg ldtr; > + struct vmcb_seg idtr; > + struct vmcb_seg tr; > + uint64_t vmpl0_ssp; > + uint64_t vmpl1_ssp; > + uint64_t vmpl2_ssp; > + uint64_t vmpl3_ssp; > + uint64_t u_cet; > + uint8_t reserved_0xc8[2]; > + uint8_t vmpl; > + uint8_t cpl; > + uint8_t reserved_0xcc[4]; > + uint64_t efer; > + uint8_t reserved_0xd8[104]; > + uint64_t xss; > + uint64_t cr4; > + uint64_t cr3; > + uint64_t cr0; > + uint64_t dr7; > + uint64_t dr6; > + uint64_t rflags; > + uint64_t rip; > + uint64_t dr0; > + uint64_t dr1; > + uint64_t dr2; > + uint64_t dr3; > + uint64_t dr0_addr_mask; > + uint64_t dr1_addr_mask; > + uint64_t dr2_addr_mask; > + uint64_t dr3_addr_mask; > + uint8_t reserved_0x1c0[24]; > + uint64_t rsp; > + uint64_t s_cet; > + uint64_t ssp; > + uint64_t isst_addr; > + uint64_t rax; > + uint64_t star; > + uint64_t lstar; > + uint64_t cstar; > + uint64_t sfmask; > + uint64_t kernel_gs_base; > + uint64_t sysenter_cs; > + uint64_t sysenter_esp; > + uint64_t sysenter_eip; > + uint64_t cr2; > + uint8_t reserved_0x248[32]; > + uint64_t g_pat; > + uint64_t dbgctl; > + uint64_t br_from; > + uint64_t br_to; > + uint64_t last_excp_from; > + uint64_t last_excp_to; > + uint8_t reserved_0x298[80]; > + uint32_t pkru; > + uint32_t tsc_aux; > + uint8_t reserved_0x2f0[24]; > + uint64_t rcx; > + uint64_t rdx; > + uint64_t rbx; > + uint64_t reserved_0x320; /* rsp already available at 0x01d8 */ > + uint64_t rbp; > + uint64_t rsi; > + uint64_t rdi; > + uint64_t r8; > + uint64_t r9; > + uint64_t r10; > + uint64_t r11; > + uint64_t r12; > + uint64_t r13; > + uint64_t r14; > + uint64_t r15; > + uint8_t reserved_0x380[16]; > + uint64_t guest_exit_info_1; > + uint64_t guest_exit_info_2; > + uint64_t guest_exit_int_info; > + uint64_t guest_nrip; > + uint64_t sev_features; > + uint64_t vintr_ctrl; > + uint64_t guest_exit_code; > + uint64_t virtual_tom; > + uint64_t tlb_id; > + uint64_t pcpu_id; > + uint64_t event_inj; > + uint64_t xcr0; > + uint8_t reserved_0x3f0[16]; > + > + /* Floating point area */ > + uint64_t x87_dp; > + uint32_t mxcsr; > + uint16_t x87_ftw; > + uint16_t x87_fsw; > + uint16_t x87_fcw; > + uint16_t x87_fop; > + uint16_t x87_ds; > + uint16_t x87_cs; > + uint64_t x87_rip; > + uint8_t fpreg_x87[80]; > + uint8_t fpreg_xmm[256]; > + uint8_t fpreg_ymm[256]; > +}; > + > bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp); > > int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp); > -- > 2.43.0 > With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|