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From: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
To: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] target/i386: Add TSA attack variants TSA-SQ and TSA-L1
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 12:53:48 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aHcwXBFy90lBjcfF@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12881b2c03fa351316057ddc5f39c011074b4549.1752176771.git.babu.moger@amd.com>

On Thu, Jul 10, 2025 at 02:46:10PM -0500, Babu Moger wrote:
> Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 14:46:10 -0500
> From: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
> Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] target/i386: Add TSA attack variants TSA-SQ and
>  TSA-L1
> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1
> 
> Transient Scheduler Attacks (TSA) are new speculative side channel attacks
> related to the execution timing of instructions under specific
> microarchitectural conditions. In some cases, an attacker may be able to
> use this timing information to infer data from other contexts, resulting in
> information leakage.
> 
> AMD has identified two sub-variants two variants of TSA.
> CPUID Fn8000_0021 ECX[1] (TSA_SQ_NO).
> 	If this bit is 1, the CPU is not vulnerable to TSA-SQ.
> 
> CPUID Fn8000_0021 ECX[2] (TSA_L1_NO).
> 	If this bit is 1, the CPU is not vulnerable to TSA-L1.
> 
> Add the new feature word FEAT_8000_0021_ECX and corresponding bits to
> detect TSA variants.
> 
> Link: https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/bulletin/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-transient-scheduler-attacks.pdf
> Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
> ---
> v2: Split the patches into two.
>     Not adding the feature bit in CPU model now. Users can add the feature
>     bits by using the option "-cpu EPYC-Genoa,+tsa-sq-no,+tsa-l1-no".
> 
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20250709104956.GAaG5JVO-74EF96hHO@fat_crate.local/
> ---
>  target/i386/cpu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  target/i386/cpu.h |  6 ++++++
>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-16  4:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-10 19:46 [PATCH v2 1/2] target/i386: Add TSA attack variants TSA-SQ and TSA-L1 Babu Moger
2025-07-10 19:46 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] target/i386: Add TSA feature flag verw-clear Babu Moger
2025-07-16  4:55   ` Zhao Liu
2025-07-16  6:28   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-10-09 11:30   ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-07-15 22:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] target/i386: Add TSA attack variants TSA-SQ and TSA-L1 Moger, Babu
2025-07-16  4:53 ` Zhao Liu [this message]
2025-07-16  6:27 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-10-09 11:30 ` Paolo Bonzini

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