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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,  x86@kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	 dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, santosh.shukla@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 07:07:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aHeyNvzvbgrWAob5@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <229325e8-a461-6e5c-0d32-1c36086b62f7@amd.com>

On Wed, Jul 16, 2025, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 7/16/25 00:53, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > 
> > Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the
> > intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response
> > incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual
> > VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly
> > documented.
> > 
> > Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
> > * Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the
> >   guest
> > * Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
> > 
> > Add a WARN_ONCE to log the incident, as well-behaved SNP guest kernels
> > should never attempt to write to these MSRs.
> > 
> > However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
> > GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate
> > an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Feel free to drop me as author and just give me a Reported-by or Suggested-by.
At this point, I ain't doing a whole lot of anything for this patch :-)

> > +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(write)) {
> 
> Do we want to capture individual WARNs for each MSR? I guess I'm ok with
> a single WARN for either MSR, but just asking the question.

Or don't WARN at all.  If the caller is doing a bare wrmsrq(), then the kernel
will WARN in ex_handler_msr().  If the caller is doing wrmsrq_safe(), do we care
that they're being deliberately weird?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-16 14:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-16  5:53 [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-16 13:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-16 13:59   ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-16 14:07   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-07-18  3:42     ` Nikunj A Dadhania

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