From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Coiby Xu" <coxu@redhat.com>, "Breno Leitao" <leitao@debian.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Arnaud Lefebvre" <arnaud.lefebvre@clever-cloud.com>,
"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 19:38:29 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aK7uNf8n67HQW+hh@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250825180531.94bfb86a26a43127c0a1296f@linux-foundation.org>
On 08/25/25 at 06:05pm, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Aug 2025 09:18:53 +0800 Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > >diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> > >index 532d72ea42ee8..287b25e674d76 100644
> > >--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> > >+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> > >@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
> > > kbuf.buf_min = 0;
> > > kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX;
> > > kbuf.top_down = false;
> > >+ kbuf.random = 0;
> > >
> > > kbuf.buffer = kernel;
> > > kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len;
> > >
> >
> > And also thanks for posing a fix! The patch LGTM. Can you add a Fixes
> > tag 'Fixes: bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf
> > randomly")' and then send it to kexec@lists.infradead.org? Thanks!
>
> I turned all this into a regular patch and queued it (see below),
> thanks. No additional actions are needed.
>
> I'm really not liking that code. I laboriously verified that all
> fields of kexec_buf are now initialized, except for `cma'. Is that a
> bug?
>
> This function has a call frequency of about 3x per week. Can we please
> just memset the whole thing so people don't have to worry about this
> any more?
Yeah, adding these trivial patches to mute XXSAN warning is annoying.
Maybe arm64 can initialize the local variable kbuf like we do in x86_64
as below, to explicitly set the necessary fields when defining.
static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
unsigned long initrd_len, char *cmdline,
unsigned long cmdline_len)
{
......
struct kexec_buf kbuf = { .image = image, .buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
.top_down = true };
struct kexec_buf pbuf = { .image = image, .buf_min = MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR,
.buf_max = ULONG_MAX, .top_down = true };
.....
}
>
>
> From: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
> Subject: kexec/arm64: initialize the random field of kbuf to zero in the image loader
> Date: Thu Aug 21 04:11:21 2025 -0700
>
> Add an explicit initialization for the random member of the kbuf structure
> within the image_load function in arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c.
> Setting kbuf.random to zero ensures a deterministic and clean starting
> state for the buffer used during kernel image loading, avoiding this UBSAN
> issue later, when kbuf.random is read.
>
> [ 32.362488] UBSAN: invalid-load in ./include/linux/kexec.h:210:10
> [ 32.362649] load of value 252 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
>
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/oninomspajhxp4omtdapxnckxydbk2nzmrix7rggmpukpnzadw@c67o7njgdgm3
> Fixes: bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
> Cc: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
> Cc: Kairui Song <ryncsn@gmail.com>
> Cc: Liu Pingfan <kernelfans@gmail.com>
> Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
> Cc: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> ---
>
> arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c~kexec-arm64-initialize-the-random-field-of-kbuf-to-zero-in-the-image-loader
> +++ a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *i
> kbuf.buf_min = 0;
> kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX;
> kbuf.top_down = false;
> + kbuf.random = 0;
>
> kbuf.buffer = kernel;
> kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len;
> _
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-27 15:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-02 1:12 [PATCH v9 0/8] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2025-08-21 11:15 ` Breno Leitao
2025-08-25 1:18 ` Coiby Xu
2025-08-26 1:05 ` Andrew Morton
2025-08-27 11:38 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2025-08-27 13:38 ` Breno Leitao
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] crash_dump: store dm crypt keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] Revert "x86/mm: Remove unused __set_memory_prot()" Coiby Xu
2025-05-04 6:46 ` Andrew Morton
2025-05-07 3:05 ` Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2025-05-02 1:12 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
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