Re: [RESEND PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sev: Add new quiet parameter to snp_leak_pages() API

[Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>]

On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 2fbdebf79fbb..a7db96a5f56d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
>  static int kvm_rmp_make_shared(struct kvm *kvm, u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
>  {
>  	if (KVM_BUG_ON(rmp_make_shared(pfn, level), kvm)) {
> -		snp_leak_pages(pfn, page_level_size(level) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +		snp_leak_pages(pfn, page_level_size(level) >> PAGE_SHIFT, false);
>  		return -EIO;
>  	}
>  
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int snp_page_reclaim(struct kvm *kvm, u64 pfn)
>  	data.paddr = __sme_set(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>  	rc = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM, &data, &fw_err);
>  	if (KVM_BUG(rc, kvm, "Failed to reclaim PFN %llx, rc %d fw_err %d", pfn, rc, fw_err)) {
> -		snp_leak_pages(pfn, 1);
> +		snp_leak_pages(pfn, 1, false);

Open coded true/false literals are ugly, e.g. now I have to go look at the
declaration (or even definition) of snp_leak_pages() to understand what %false
controls.

Assuming "don't dump the RMP entry" is the rare case, then craft the APIs to
reflect that, i.e. make snp_leak_pages() a wrapper for the common case.  As a
bonus, you don't need to churn any extra code either.

void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp);

static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
{
	__snp_leak_pages(pfn, npages, true);
}

>  		return -EIO;
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index 942372e69b4d..d75659859a07 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
>  
> -void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
> +void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool quiet)
>  {
>  	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
>  
> @@ -1052,7 +1052,8 @@ void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
>  		    (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages))
>  			list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
>  
> -		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
> +		if (!quiet)

The polarity is arbitrarily odd, and "quiet" is annoyingly ambiguous and arguably
misleading, e.g. one could expect "quiet=true" to suppress the pr_warn() too, but
it does not.

	pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages)

If you call it "bool dump_rmp" then it's more precise, self-explanatory, and
doesn't need to be inverted.

> +			dump_rmpentry(pfn);
>  		snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
>  		pfn++;
>  		page++;
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> index 4f000dc2e639..203a43a2df63 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static int snp_reclaim_pages(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, bool lock
>  	 * If there was a failure reclaiming the page then it is no longer safe
>  	 * to release it back to the system; leak it instead.
>  	 */
> -	snp_leak_pages(__phys_to_pfn(paddr), npages - i);
> +	snp_leak_pages(__phys_to_pfn(paddr), npages - i, false);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.34.1
>