From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/12] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2026 18:31:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aVfy6lcJ0F6vzY_I@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <57e69d4fd5a40899cd779ee04f29f33009c97431.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Fri, Dec 19, 2025 at 03:54:47PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2025-12-16 at 11:21 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always
> > does set up either password or HMAC session.
> >
> > Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
> > TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised
> > at run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.
>
> Shouldn't that also be
>
> Fixes: b7960b904861 ("tpm2-sessions: Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session()")
The implementation has pre-existed before that commit so it did
not really cause it. The call path was just more masked before
open coding it.
The code is of course exercised in !TCG_TPM2_HMAC case but it
by definition does nothing.
>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> > index d3a5c5f2b926..3666e3e48eab 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> > @@ -451,10 +451,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip
> > *chip,
> > struct trusted_key_options *options,
> > u32 blob_handle)
> > {
> > - struct tpm_header *head;
> > struct tpm_buf buf;
> > u16 data_len;
> > - int offset;
> > u8 *data;
> > int rc;
> >
> > @@ -495,14 +493,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip
> > *chip,
> > tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
> > tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options-
> > >blobauth_len);
> >
> > - if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> > + if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
>
> Since the statement above is that the if is always true, why do you
> still have it here?
This is still necessary for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC case. The commit is pretty
much exactly in its described scope.
>
> Regards,
>
> James
>
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-02 16:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-16 9:21 [PATCH v8 00/12] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random_bytes_wait() instead of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19 9:21 ` Jonathan McDowell
2026-01-02 16:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] tpm: Orchestrate TPM commands in tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19 9:43 ` Jonathan McDowell
2026-01-02 16:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] tpm: Change tpm_get_random() opportunistic Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 22:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19 9:42 ` Jonathan McDowell
2026-01-02 16:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19 9:32 ` Jonathan McDowell
2026-01-02 16:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19 9:37 ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-19 20:54 ` James Bottomley
2026-01-02 16:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] tpm2-sessions: Remove the support for more than one authorization Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 9:21 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] tpm-buf: Implement managed allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
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