From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"open list:S390 ARCHITECTURE" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:EXTENSIBLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (EFI)"
<linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2026 09:28:43 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aY0rZp9ROwfjPgD8@Rk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <66f9d13875e81a965984e2a661e992a3fe43c516.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, Feb 09, 2026 at 03:43:08PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>On Tue, 2026-02-03 at 12:14 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>> EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of
>> the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot
>> function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general function
>> named arch_get_secureboot.
>>
>> Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
>
>Thanks, Coiby. Other than unnecessarily splitting a line, the patch set looks
>good. As soon as the open window closes, I'll queue these patches for linux-
>next.
Hi Mimi, thanks for reviewing the patch set! Would you like me to send a
new version with the line splitting issue fixed?
>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
>> index 138029bfcce1..27521d665d33 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
[...]
>> {
>> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) &&
>> + arch_get_secureboot()) {
>
>No need to split the line here or below.
>
>
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
>> set_module_sig_enforced();
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> index 5770cf691912..6d093ac82a45 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> @@ -949,8 +949,8 @@ static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>>
>> switch (id) {
>> case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
>> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
>> - && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) &&
>> + arch_get_secureboot()) {
>
>===>
>
>Mimi
>
>> pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
>> return -EACCES;
>> }
>
--
Best regards,
Coiby
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-12 1:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-03 4:14 [PATCH v2 0/3] Make detecting the secure boot status integrity-wide Coiby Xu
2026-02-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide Coiby Xu
2026-02-09 20:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2026-02-12 1:28 ` Coiby Xu [this message]
2026-02-12 20:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2026-02-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled Coiby Xu
2026-02-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT Coiby Xu
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-02-03 15:14 [PATCH v2 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide kernel test robot
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