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From: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 07:50:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ac8b6afa-813d-56c7-094a-8891ba69deeb@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221209132524.20200-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>



On 12/9/22 5:25 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> == Background ==
> 
> There is a class of side-channel attacks against SGX enclaves called
> "SGX Step"[1]. These attacks create lots of exceptions inside of
> enclaves. Basically, run an in-enclave instruction, cause an exception.
> Over and over.
> 
> There is a concern that a VMM could attack a TDX guest in the same way
> by causing lots of #VE's. The TDX architecture includes new
> countermeasures for these attacks. It basically counts the number of
> exceptions and can send another *special* exception once the number of
> VMM-induced #VE's hits a critical threshold[2].
> 
> == Problem ==
> 
> But, these special exceptions are independent of any action that the
> guest takes. They can occur anywhere that the guest executes. This
> includes sensitive areas like the entry code. The (non-paranoid) #VE
> handler is incapable of handling exceptions in these areas.
> 
> == Solution ==
> 
> Fortunately, the special exceptions can be disabled by the guest via
> write to NOTIFY_ENABLES TDCS field. NOTIFY_ENABLES is disabled by
> default, but might be enabled by a bootloader, firmware or an earlier
> kernel before the current kernel runs.
> 
> Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES feature explicitly and unconditionally. Any
> NOTIFY_ENABLES-based #VE's that occur before this point will end up
> in the early #VE exception handler and die due to unexpected exit
> reason.
> 
> [1] https://github.com/jovanbulck/sgx-step
> [2] https://intel.github.io/ccc-linux-guest-hardening-docs/security-spec.html#safety-against-ve-in-kernel-code
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---

I don't think you need to explicitly use section names (Background,
problem or solution) in the commit log. But it is up to you.

Rest looks good.


>  arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> index 0e47846ff8ff..c93c2fd2e113 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
>  #define TDX_GET_VEINFO			3
>  #define TDX_GET_REPORT			4
>  #define TDX_ACCEPT_PAGE			6
> +#define TDX_WR				8
> +
> +/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */
> +#define TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES		0x9100000000000010
>  
>  /* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */
>  #define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA		0x10001
> @@ -858,6 +862,9 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
>  	tdx_parse_tdinfo(&cc_mask);
>  	cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
>  
> +	/* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */
> +	tdx_module_call(TDX_WR, 0, TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL, NULL);
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * All bits above GPA width are reserved and kernel treats shared bit
>  	 * as flag, not as part of physical address.

-- 
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer

  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-09 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-09 13:25 [PATCH 0/4] x86/tdx: Changes for TDX guest initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 13:25 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/tdx: Expand __tdx_hypercall() to handle more arguments Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-13 22:44   ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-09 13:25 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/tdx: Use ReportFatalError to report missing SEPT_VE_DISABLE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 15:42   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-09 17:06     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 20:51       ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-12 16:10         ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-12 16:37           ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-12 16:39             ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-13 23:06   ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-15 17:12     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-15 18:18       ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-15 18:51         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-15 21:09           ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-16  2:38             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-16 15:22               ` Reshetova, Elena
2022-12-09 13:25 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/tdx: Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 15:45   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-09 17:08     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-13 23:13   ` Dave Hansen
2022-12-15 15:40     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 13:25 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-09 15:50   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy [this message]
2022-12-09 17:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-12-13 23:17   ` Dave Hansen

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