From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Andrè Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
"Uros Bizjak" <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>
Subject: Re: [patch V3 00/14] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:45:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <acp-l792SFNG9ROS@J2N7QTR9R3> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260330114212.927686587@kernel.org>
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 02:01:58PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> This is a follow up to v2 which can be found here:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/20260319225224.853416463@kernel.org
>
> The v1 cover letter contains a detailed analysis of the underlying
> problem:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/20260316162316.356674433@kernel.org
>
> TLDR:
>
> The robust futex unlock mechanism is racy in respect to the clearing of the
> robust_list_head::list_op_pending pointer because unlock and clearing the
> pointer are not atomic. The race window is between the unlock and clearing
> the pending op pointer. If the task is forced to exit in this window, exit
> will access a potentially invalid pending op pointer when cleaning up the
> robust list. That happens if another task manages to unmap the object
> containing the lock before the cleanup, which results in an UAF. In the
> worst case this UAF can lead to memory corruption when unrelated content
> has been mapped to the same address by the time the access happens.
>
> User space can't solve this problem without help from the kernel. This
> series provides the kernel side infrastructure to help it along:
>
> 1) Combined unlock, pointer clearing, wake-up for the contended case
>
> 2) VDSO based unlock and pointer clearing helpers with a fix-up function
> in the kernel when user space was interrupted within the critical
> section.
I see the vdso bits in this series are specific to x86. Do other
architectures need something here?
I might be missing some context; I'm not sure whether that's not
necessary or just not implemented by this series, and so I'm not sure
whether arm64 folk and other need to go dig into this.
[...]
> Changes since v2:
> - Rename ARCH_STORE_IMPLIES_RELEASE to ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TOS - Peter
I believe that should be s/TOS/TSO/, since the standard terminology is
Total Store Order (TSO).
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-30 13:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-30 12:01 [patch V3 00/14] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 01/14] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 02/14] futex: Make futex_mm_init() void Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 03/14] futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 15:23 ` Alexander Kuleshov
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 04/14] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 05/14] uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 13:33 ` Mark Rutland
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 06/14] x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TOS Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 13:34 ` Mark Rutland
2026-03-30 19:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 07/14] futex: Cleanup UAPI defines Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 08/14] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 09/14] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 10/14] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:02 ` [patch V3 11/14] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:03 ` [patch V3 12/14] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:03 ` [patch V3 13/14] Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 12:03 ` [patch V3 14/14] selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-30 13:45 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2026-03-30 13:51 ` [patch V3 00/14] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-30 19:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-31 14:12 ` Mark Rutland
2026-03-31 12:59 ` André Almeida
2026-03-31 13:03 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-31 14:13 ` Mark Rutland
2026-03-31 15:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
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