All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 11:24:12 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <adYQrEp84CI3Ju3o@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0ce8d850-9ca7-4327-a6be-d1cb84925915@linux.ibm.com>

On Thu, Mar 26, 2026 at 10:34:58PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> 
> On 3/24/26 4:30 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a
> > feature in Linux kernel.  Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for
> > trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags.
> > 
> > Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden
> > the feature as follows:
> > 
> > 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
> >     used.
> > 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
> > 
> > Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing
> > trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line.
> > 
> > Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> > Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> 
> 
> Tested on PKWM and emulated TPM backends.
> 
> Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>

Thank you!

As it is uprised as a feature (like it should as ad-hoc compilation
flags are harmful), this also requires a boot flag so that "I know
what I'm doing" is addressed.

I'll send one more round with a flag 'trusted.debug=0|1'. These extra
steps protect production kernels for reasonable measure.

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-08  8:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-24 11:00 [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-03-24 11:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-03-26 17:04 ` Srish Srinivasan
2026-04-08  8:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-03-24 11:00 Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-04-07  2:42 ` Nayna Jain
2026-04-08  8:26   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-04-08  8:29     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-04-09  0:41     ` Nayna Jain
2026-03-24 11:01 Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=adYQrEp84CI3Ju3o@kernel.org \
    --to=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=a.fatoum@pengutronix.de \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=kernel@pengutronix.de \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nayna@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=ssrish@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.