All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
To: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	 Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
	 Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE
Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 15:27:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <afoMad-xL2bh0SZV@plex> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505133922.797635-1-pratyush@kernel.org>

On 05-05 15:39, Pratyush Yadav wrote:
> From: "Pratyush Yadav (Google)" <pratyush@kernel.org>
> 
> When SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the
> implied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not
> have any writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply
> SEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings.
> 
> This breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an
> attacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still
> be modified arbitrarily.
> 
> Fix this by adding the implied seals before the call for
> mapping_deny_writable() is done.
> 
> Fixes: c4f75bc8bd6b ("mm/memfd: add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav (Google) <pratyush@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> 

> ---
>  mm/memfd.c | 12 ++++++------
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> index fb425f4e315f..abe13b291ddc 100644
> --- a/mm/memfd.c
> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> @@ -283,6 +283,12 @@ int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
>  		goto unlock;
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * SEAL_EXEC implies SEAL_WRITE, making W^X from the start.
> +	 */
> +	if (seals & F_SEAL_EXEC && inode->i_mode & 0111)
> +		seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
> +
>  	if ((seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) && !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)) {
>  		error = mapping_deny_writable(file->f_mapping);
>  		if (error)
> @@ -295,12 +301,6 @@ int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * SEAL_EXEC implies SEAL_WRITE, making W^X from the start.
> -	 */
> -	if (seals & F_SEAL_EXEC && inode->i_mode & 0111)
> -		seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
> -
>  	*file_seals |= seals;
>  	error = 0;
>  
> -- 
> 2.54.0.545.g6539524ca2-goog
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-05 15:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-05 13:39 [PATCH] memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE Pratyush Yadav
2026-05-05 15:27 ` Pasha Tatashin [this message]
2026-05-05 15:37 ` Pasha Tatashin
2026-05-05 15:52   ` Pasha Tatashin
2026-05-05 23:54 ` Jeff Xu
2026-05-08  9:37 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-11 10:52   ` Pratyush Yadav

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=afoMad-xL2bh0SZV@plex \
    --to=pasha.tatashin@soleen.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com \
    --cc=gthelen@google.com \
    --cc=hughd@google.com \
    --cc=jackmanb@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=pratyush@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.