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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	d.riley@proxmox.com,  jon@nutanix.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault()
Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 07:35:23 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <afyjK5HOF63-95XL@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505195226.563317-9-pbonzini@redhat.com>

On Tue, May 05, 2026, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Move more of EPT handling entirely in the existing "if (!ept)"
> conditional.  Use a new "rf" variable instead of uf for read permissions
> for clarity.
> 
> Merge smepf and ff into a single variable because EPT's "SMEP" (actually
> MBEC) is defined differently and does not need smepf.
> 
> Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index d94a488db79d..fc34536c536b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -5584,24 +5584,28 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
>  		 * that causes a fault with the given PFEC.
>  		 */
>  
> +		/* Faults from reads to non-readable pages */
> +		u8 rf = 0;
>  		/* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
>  		u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? (u8)~w : 0;
>  		/* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
> -		u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> -		/* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
> -		u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
> -		/* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
> -		u8 smepf = 0;
> +		u8 uf = 0;
> +		/* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages */
> +		u8 ff = 0;
>  		/* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */
>  		u8 smapf = 0;
>  
> -		if (!ept) {
> +		if (ept) {
> +			rf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> +			ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
> +		} else {
>  			/* Faults from kernel mode accesses to user pages */
>  			u8 kf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? 0 : u;
>  
> -			/* Not really needed: !nx will cause pte.nx to fault */
> -			if (!efer_nx)
> -				ff = 0;
> +			uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> +
> +			if (efer_nx)
> +				ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;

I still think we should do:

			if (efer_nx)
				ff |= (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;

so that the order of the efer_nx and cr4_smep logic doesn't matter.

>  
>  			/* Allow supervisor writes if !cr0.wp */
>  			if (!cr0_wp)
> @@ -5609,7 +5613,7 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
>  
>  			/* Disallow supervisor fetches of user code if cr4.smep */
>  			if (cr4_smep)
> -				smepf = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? kf : 0;
> +				ff |= (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? kf : 0;

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-07 14:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-05 19:51 [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:35   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: hard code more bits in kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Sean Christopherson
2026-05-07 17:49   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 10:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-11 10:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 11:07     ` David Riley
2026-05-14  2:11       ` Chao Gao
2026-05-14 19:13         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-12 14:32   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-12 16:34     ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-15 14:53     ` David Riley
2026-05-15 18:31       ` Sean Christopherson
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:35   ` Sean Christopherson

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