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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: Mohammed EL Kadiri <med08elkadiri@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] keys: prevent slab cache merging for key_jar
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 17:52:43 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aigoZeoqygyBYCbR@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <85a686a6-7fcc-4a1d-8574-0fc7c2f84bc8@kernel.org>

On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 09:20:39AM +0200, Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) wrote:
> On 6/8/26 06:22, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 01:50:34PM +0100, Mohammed EL Kadiri wrote:
> >> The key_jar slab cache holds struct key objects containing cryptographic
> >> keys, authentication tokens, and keyring linkage. This cache currently
> >> lacks merge prevention, allowing the SLUB allocator to merge it with
> >> other similarly-sized caches.
> >> 
> >> On a default Ubuntu 6.17.0-23-generic system, key_jar has 5 aliases,
> >> meaning 5 unrelated object types share its slab pages. struct key is
> >> 224 bytes, placed in 256-byte slabs alongside biovec-16, maple_node,
> >> ip6_dst_cache, task_delay_info, and kmalloc-256 users.
> >> 
> >> Cross-cache heap exploitation is a well-documented attack class
> >> (CVE-2022-29582, CVE-2022-2588, CVE-2021-22555) where slab cache
> >> merging enables type confusion between unrelated kernel objects. A
> >> use-after-free in any subsystem sharing slab pages with key_jar could
> >> allow an attacker to reclaim a freed slot as a struct key, or corrupt
> >> an existing key through a dangling pointer to a different type.
> >> 
> >> Add SLAB_NO_MERGE to ensure key_jar receives dedicated slab pages,
> >> eliminating cross-cache attacks targeting struct key. The memory
> >> overhead is minimal: with 32 objects per slab page and typical key
> >> usage bounded by system keyring size, the cost of dedicated pages is
> >> negligible. There is zero performance impact on the allocation hot
> >> path.
> >> 
> >> This follows the precedent set by skbuff_head_cache (net/core/skbuff.c)
> >> which uses SLAB_NO_MERGE for similar isolation requirements.
> 
> I just realized this part is somewhat misleading, because it's done there
> for performance reasons, so I wouldn't say "similar".

Mohammed, could you at least send v2, which does not emphasize on
CVEs? It's better the use no_merge for sake of hardnening but some
risk is not same as vulnerability.

I'll replace the patch in my tree with updated once I get it.

Or I can strip off the parts myself, whatever goes...

> 
> > 
> > ~/work/kernel.org/jarkko/linux-tpmdd master*
> > ❯ git log --oneline -1 d0bf7d5759c1d89fb013aa41cca5832e00b9632a
> > d0bf7d5759c1 mm/slab: introduce kmem_cache flag SLAB_NO_MERGE
> > 
> > ~/work/kernel.org/jarkko/linux-tpmdd master*
> > ❯ git describe --contains d0bf7d5759c1d89fb013aa41cca5832e00b9632a
> > v6.5-rc1~137^2^3~1
> > 
> > So we could probably forward to stable's starting from v6.6+ if that
> > is necessary / makes sense?
> 
> It won't hurt, but I doubt it's "necessary" per stable rules. But stable
> maintainers ignore those themselves anyway, so whatever.
> 
> > It's not a bug fix but kind of still I think would be a change that
> > stable kernels are better off with it than without it.
> > 
> > What do you think?
> 
> Won't object.

Yeah, I agree, and yeah I think commit message goes over the top, while
the change is for better.

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-09 14:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-04 12:50 [PATCH] keys: prevent slab cache merging for key_jar Mohammed EL Kadiri
2026-06-05 12:16 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-08  4:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-06-08  4:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-06-08  7:20   ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-09 14:52     ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-06-09 15:15       ` Mohammed EL Kadiri
2026-06-09 15:36         ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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